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"Charitable Choice" and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the Need for
Regulation with the First Amendment
Religion Clauses
Michele Estrin Gilman

55 Vand. L. Rev. 799 (2002)

Since 1996, Congress has included charitable choice
provisions in several social welfare statutes to encourage the
participation of religious organizations in administering government-funded social service programs. The current administration has proposed expanding charitable choice programs to
allow even greater public funding of private social service providers. In this Article, Professor Michele Gilman discusses the
lack of accountability to beneficiaries that occurs when public
funds are given to religious organizations for secular programs, and she proposes solutions to this problem. As Professor Gilman explains, doctrines that constrain abuses of governmental discretion, such as administrative procedure acts
and constitutional restrictions, generally do not apply when
public programs are privatized. Moreover, religious organizations are often insulated from public scrutiny by First Amendment concerns about entangling government in religion, as
well as by special immunities from tort liability and limited
fiduciary duties for directors. The mechanisms of privatization, such as contracts and vouchers, also fail to ensure that
beneficiaries receive quality services.
To ensure that beneficiaries are receiving effective services, Professor Gilman proposes that charitable choice programs be required to adopt a set of measures to improve accountability. These measures enhance accountability by involving beneficiaries in setting clear standards, evaluating outcomes, and enforcing rights to quality services. Finally, Profes-

sor Gilman analyzes current Supreme Court case law on providing public funding to religious entities, and explains why
requiring charitable choice programs to implement accountability measures does not violate the First Amendment Religion Clauses.
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INTRODUCTION

Charitable choice, or the use of federal money to fund social
services provided by religious organizations, has engendered controversy and confusion since its inception in the 1996 welfare reform legislation. Under the welfare reform statute, entitled the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRA"), states may contract out administration of their welfare
programs to private entities, including houses of worship.l President Bush is promoting the expansion of charitable choice into
other federal social service programs as a major policy initiative of
his administration. 2 Federal funding of faith-based organizations
has supporters and opponents on both the left and the right.3 Supporters argue that charitable choice ends discrimination against
religious organizations in competing for federal funds, and that religious organizations provide more effective social services than
governments because of the spiritual and moral guidance the religious organizations provide. 4 Opponents on the right counter that
charitable choice will destroy the unique nature of religious organizations, make churches overly reliant on federal funds, and result
in federal funding of objectionable groups.5 Opponents on the left
charge that charitable choice violates the separation of church and

1.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a
(Supp. III 1997». There are also charitable choice provisions in the Welfare·to·Work block grant
program, Community Services Block Grant ("CSBG") programs, and some Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration ("SAMHSA") drug treatment funding. See
http://www.welfareinfo.org/faithbase.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2002). In this Article, the term
"church" is used to refer to all types of houses of worship, such as synagogues, mosques, and the
like.
2.
Dana Milbank, Bush Unveils 'Faith·Based' Initiative; Effort Will Team Agencies, Non·
profits on Social Issues, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2001, at A1.
3.
See, e.g., Henry G. Brinton, It's Tempting, But My Church Says No Thanks, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2000, at B1; Dana Milbank, Senators Slow Action on 'Faith-Based' Aid, WASH.
POST, Mar. 14, 2001, at Al (summarizing arguments for and against charitable choice); see also
http://www.cpjustice.org/charitablechoice.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002) (promoting charitable
choice and providing guidance on the law's interpretation).
4.
See generally CHARLES L. GLENN, THE AMBIGUOUS EMBRACE: GOVERNMENT AND FAITHBASED SCHOOLS AND SOCIAL AGENCIES (2000) (presenting a study of faith-based organizations
and arguing in favor of charitable' choice).
5. See, e.g., BAPTIST JOINT COMM. ON PUB. AFFAIRS & THE INTERFAITH ALLIANCE FOUND.,
KEEPING THE FAITH: THE PROMISE OF COOPERATION, THE PERILS OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING: A
GUIDE FOR HOUSES OF WORSHIP 4, 6 (2001) (counseling against houses of worship accepting
government funds for social services and listing arguments against charitable choice), at
http://www.interfaithalliance.orglInitiativeslktf.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2002); Melissa Rogers,
The Wrong Way to Do Right: Charitable Choice and Churches, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH·
BASED ORGANIZATIONS 61 (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1999); Caryle Murphy, Religious
Leaders Cautious on Bush Plan: Some Fear Dependency and Too Much Scrutiny, WASH. POST,
Feb. 1, 2001, at B1.
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state and federally subsidizes discrimination, because religious organizations are exempt from some antidiscrimination employment
laws. 6
Yet these arguments miss an equally vexing problem arising
under charitable choice: How can government ensure accountability
from its sectarian contracting partners? This has profound ramifications for all of the constituents involved, including government
funding agencies, the tax-paying public, social service providers,
program beneficiaries, elected officials, advocacy groups, foundations, agency administrators, and others affected by, or interested
in, a particular human services program. 7
The PRA aims to move welfare recipients into the workforce.
Rather than handing out welfare checks, welfare administratorswhether public or private-are charged with putting people to
work. As a result, under the PRA's charitable choice provision,
faith-based organizations are providing a variety of social services
designed to move welfare recipients towards self-sufficiency, including child care, substance abuse treatment, homeless services, English courses, parenting classes, mentoring, job training, mental
health counseling, life skills training, affordable housing, domestic
violence shelters, transportation to job sites, and fatherhood programs. 8 With President Bush's proposed expansion of charitable
choice into other federally funded programs, churches can be expected to provide an even greater array of social services. Despite
this proposed expansion, there is scant empirical evidence as to the
effectiveness of the faith-based approach.9 The existing anecdotal
6. See, e.g., DANIEL E. KATZ & JULIE A. SEGAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS
WITH SENATOR AsHCROFT'S 'CHARITABLE CHOICE' PROVISIONS (1996), available at
http://www.aclu.org/congress/ashcrft.btml (last visited Feb. 1,2002).
7.
LAWRENCE L. MARTIN & PETER M. KETTNER, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF HUMAN
SERVICE PROGRAMS 2 (1996) (listing the various stakeholders in human service programs).
8.
AMY L. SHERMAN, THE GROWING IMPACT OF CHARITABLE CHOICE: A CATALOGUE OF NEW
COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS IN NINE STATES 2583 (2000) (cataloging the types of services being provided by faith-based organizations under
contract with government); see also Rebecca Brown, Emerging Issues and Opportunities for
Community Based Organization Involvement in Welfare Reform, WELFARE INFO. NETWORK ISSUE
NOTES
(Welfare
Info.
Network,
Washington,
D.C.),
Mar.
2001,
at
http://www.welfareinfo.org/cboinvolve-mentinwelfarereformissuenote.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2002).
9.
President Bush's first head of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives,
John J. DiIulio, Jr., acknowledged as much in a 1997 article: "[W]e remain a long way from a
definitive body of research evidence on the actual extent and the efficacy of church-anchored and
faith-based social programs." John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Lord's Work: The Church and the "Civil
Society Sector," BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 27, 27-30. See generally Martin Davis, Faith,
Hope, and Charity, 33 NAT'L J. 1228 (2001) (discussing origins of Present Bush's charitable
choice initiative in similar Texas program); Susan Hogan, Scholars: Plan Relies on Faith, Not
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evidence points in both directions. For every claimed success story,
such as the eighty-five percent drug rehabilitation success rate of a
Christian treatment program called Teen Challenge,10 there is a
horror story, such as the alleged child abuse that occurred at Roloff
Homes in Texas, a church-run home for troubled youths. ll Given
the lack of empirical evidence, ensuring accountability should be a
paramount concern. Currently, it is not. To the contrary, several
charitable choice proponents, including President Bush, advocate
removing regulatory burdens from faith-based providers altogether
to encourage their participation in federally funded programs. 12
When government provides social services,13 a mix of laws
and legal doctrines operate to constrain official discretion and to
provide openness and participation in the administrative process.
For instance, under federal and state administrative procedure

Facts: Standards Are Sought for Bush Aid Program, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 4, 2001, at 1A
(discussing need to study performance of faith-based charities in social services); Eyal Press,
Lead Us Not into Temptation, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 9, 2001 (discussing lack of evidence to support
assertion that faith-based groups perform social services best), available at
http://www.prospect.org/printJv12/6/press-e.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2002); see also Lewis D.
Solomon & Matthew J. Vlissades, Faith Based Charities and the Quest to Solve America's Social
Ills: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y, 265, 289-97 (2001) (reviewing
empirical studies and concluding that religion can lessen deviant behavior where individuals
have a structured environment, but that structure is lacking in many poor communities).
One of the few comprehensive studies on this issue found that people who consider religion
and spirituality important are less likely than nonbelievers to abuse alcohol and drugs. See
NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ADUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., So HELP ME GOD:
SUBSTANCE
ABUSE,
RELIGION
AND
SPIRITUALITY
(2001),
available
at
http://www.casacolumbia.org/publications/456/publications-show.htm?docid=91513 (last visited
Feb. 1, 2002). However, this study did not address whether secular or sectarian treatment programs are more effective, and it is not clear whether religion or other independent factors, such
as family support, decrease socially undesirable behaviors.
10. See NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 9, at
26 (describing the claimed success rate of Teen Challenge and the critiques of the underlying
study).
11. See John Gibeaut, 'Welcome to Hell', AB.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 44.
12. See John Gibeaut, A Question of Faith, Bush Considers Licensing Exemption for Religious-Based Social Services, AB.A J., Aug. 2001, at 46. In an Executive Order issued on January 29, 2001, creating the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Bush
asked five federal agencies to identify and propose reforms to eliminate regulatory barriers that
discourage faith-based providers from seeking federal funds. Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed.
Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 31, 2001). The departments include: Health and Human Services, Housing and
Urban Development, Justice, Labor, and Education. Id.
13. The term "social services" is usually defined in this country to mean "agencies that provide direct income and other material support, individual and family services, day care, residential care (except for nursing homes), job training, mental health and addiction services, nonhospital health care, as well as agencies that engage in community organizing, advocacy, or community development, including research and public education." Lester M. Salamon, Social Services,
in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT SECTOR? 134, 136 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992).
Hospitals, schools, and arts, culture, and recreation organizations are excluded from this
definition. Id.
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acts, agencies must provide opportunities for notice and comment in
issuing regulatory policies and must provide fair procedures before
depriving persons of benefits. In addition, freedom of information
acts and open meeting laws at both the federal and state levels
open government decisionmaking to public review. Further, the
government cannot violate the constitutional rights of social service
beneficiaries, including their free speech rights, their rights against
unlawful search and seizure, and their due process rights. By contrast, when private entities deliver social services, these doctrines
generally do not apply. Simply put, the law has not caught up with
the modern reality of public and private interconnectedness and
interdependence that marks our social welfare state. 14
Moreover, religious organizations are generally shielded
from public review by First Amendment interpretations that protect
religion from government interference. Like other nonprofits, most
churches are organized as corporations, and thus, are run by boards
of directors. While nonprofit directors owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation, there are no teeth behind these requirements. Resource limitations also mean that state and federal officials do little
to ensure that nonprofits are acting in accord with their purported
charitable purposes. At the same time, many states provide charities, including churches, with some level of immunity from their
torts, further insulating them from accountability. In brief, the law
governing nonprofit organizations and churches tends to take a
hands-off approach towards these entities, which provides scant
accountability towards donors, funders, members, service beneficiaries, and other affected parties. When a charity is operating in the
purely private sphere, these various constituents generally have a
choice whether to donate to, volunteer for, or accept services from
the charity. Yet when the charity is expending federal funds, taxpayers and beneficiaries do not always have the choice to opt out.
Accountability in the social service arena is essential. Not
only are public dollars at stake, but the beneficiaries of these programs are some of our neediest and most vulnerable populations,
including children, the disabled, and the elderly. Nevertheless, current accountability mechanisms are insufficient to ensure that service delivery goals are met. This Article describes the lack of accountability that accompanies the transfer of charitable choice dollars, and provides a proposal for remedying this gap. This Article
14. LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT
RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 15 (1995) (describing the interdependent relationship between private sector and government in delivering human services).
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urges state and local governments to put a variety of measures in
place to prevent abuses by private social service providers, to monitor the performance of providers based on clearly articulated outcomes, and, as a last resort, to allow beneficiaries to enforce quality
standards through legal remedies. These standards should apply to
all social service providers, not just churches. Regulation of
churches, however, raises First Amendment concerns not implicated by regulation of governmental and secular providers. Although the proposed measures may seem almost painfully obvious,
few jurisdictions are implementing anything like them. To the contrary, most jurisdictions enter into boilerplate contracts with social
service providers and lack the expertise, resources, or desire to
monitor the actual services for which they have contracted.
Despite their common sense nature, the quality assurance
proposals in this Article raise profound questions under the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, which mandate that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise th~r~of."15 $pecifically, the constitutional
question arises: How far may government go in ensuring accountability from its sectarian contracting partners? Under the Religion
Clauses, government can neither impose religion nor interfere with
religious practices. Government regulation of charitable choice
funds brings these two proscriptions into conflict. Some religious
organizations argue that government oversight of their charitable
choice programs will result in. excessive entanglement between
church and state and will cause them to lose their unique character.
Accordingly, they seek exemption from otherwise generally applicable regulations-such as those proposed in this Article. This line of
argument implicates both Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
rights. Yet if government exempts religious organizations from
regulations that apply to secular providers, the government may
violate the Establishment Clause by favoring religion over nonreligion. The Supreme Court has never clarified where the tipping
points lie between acceptable and unacceptable regulation, and between acceptable and unacceptable accommodation of religious
practices. This Article attempts to clarify these battle lines and argues that regulating churches to ensure their accountability in delivering government-funded social services is not only necessary but
also constitutionally permissible.

15.

u.s. CONST. amend. I.
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Part I explains the charitable choice legislation, its history,
and how it differs from prior federal welfare funding schemes. Part
II compares accountability mechanisms in government-run programs with those in nonprofit and religious organizations. This part
also explains why contracting law and practice, as well as voucher
programs, fail to ensure quality delivery of social services. This part
concludes that there is a lack of meaningful protections for social
service beneficiaries in privatized jurisdictions under current conceptions of corporate and contract law. Part III thus proposes a
framework for increasing accountability in privatized social service
programs, focusing on the inclusion of beneficiaries in the contracting and regulatory process. Finally, Part IV addresses the constitutional questions that inevitably arise when church and state join
forces to solve social problems. Specifically, this part analyzes the
First Amendment limitations on government's ability to regulate
social service ministries and assesses whether the proposed accountability mechanisms would survive constitutional review. The
Article concludes that not only are accountability measures sorely
needed, but that they are also constitutional.
I. CHARITABLE CHOICE IN CONTEXT

The term "charitable choice" first entered the national lexicon in 1996, when it was enacted as part of the massive reform of
the federal welfare system, entitled the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.1 6 The Act eliminates openended federal welfare funding and the guarantee of assistance to all
eligible persons I7 and adopts instead a capped block grant to the
states called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families ("TANF").
The PRA also restructures the delivery of welfare benefits by devolving authority over welfare administration to the states and giving them the option to contract with private entities for service delivery or to provide vouchers for beneficiaries to redeem for welfare
services at private entities. 18 Although state and local governments
have long purchased discrete social services from nonprofit providers, the PRA expands this relationship by allowing governments to
contract out the administration of entire welfare programs, includ-

16. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 u.S.C. § 604a
(Supp. III 1997»
17. The prior welfare law was called Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 42 U.S.C. §
601 (repealed 1996).
18. § 104, 110 Stat. at 2161-63.
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ing eligibility determinations. Since enactment of the PRA, both
nonprofit and for-profit social service providers have competed vigorously for these government funds. I9 Charitable choice is one component of this privatization initiative.
Under charitable choice, faith-based organizations can vie
with other private entities for government contracts to deliver welfare benefits and related services such as eligibility determinations,
job training, employment placement, emergency housing, parenting
classes, life skills training, substance abuse treatment, and child
care. 20 Then-Senator Ashcroft, the chief sponsor of charitable
choice, argued that inclusion of religious groups was necessary to
combat the "miserable failure" of governmental programs. 21 As one
supporter defined the need for charitable choice:
People and communities in crisis need assistance that is challenging and inspiring,
that connects them to social networks and resources, that invites them to examine
their approach to life and if necessary to cast away attitudes and patterns that are
unproductive. Such relational, morally compelling, and even openly religious help
is not the province of government's own programs. 22

The charitable choice provision contains several requirements designed to ease First Amendment church-state separation
concerns while simultaneously preserving the religious character of

19. The PRA has spurred the large·scale entry of for-profit competition into the welfare
field. See DEMETRA SMITH NIGHTINGALE & NANCY M. PINDUS, URBAN INST., PRIVATIZATION OF
PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES: A BACKGROUND PAPER 5 (1997), available at http://www.urhan.org
(last visited Feh. 1, 2002); WELFARE LAw CTR., THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN SECURING WELFARE
RIGHTS AND lMPROVEMENTS IN WELFARE AND RELATED PROGRAMS 56 (1999), available at
http://www.welfarelaw.org/welfare.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal
Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 591-94 (2001).
20. See Gretchen M. Griener, Charitable Choice and Welfare Reform: Collaboration Between
State and Local Governments and Faith-Based Organizations, WELFARE INFO. NETWORK ISSUE
NOTES
(Welfare
Info.
Network,
Washington,
D.C.),
Sept.
2000,
at
http://www.welfareinfo.org/issuenotecharitablechoice.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2002).
21. Ashcroft stated:
There is a real reason to employ the services of nongovernmental charitable organizations in delivering the needs of individuals who require the welfare state.
Despite our good intentions, our welfare program and delivery system have
been a miserable failure. Yet, America's faith·based charities and nongovernmental organizations, from the Salvation Army to the Boys and Girls Clubs of
the United States have been very successful in moving people from welfare de·
pendency to the independence of work and the dignity of self-reliance.
142 CONGo REC. S8507 (daily ed. July 23, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also 141 CONGo
REC. S13500-02 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (discussing the problems
of the welfare system and the benefits offaith-based charities); 141 CONGo REC. S12924-25 (daily
ed. Sept. 8, 1995) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (same).
22. Stanley Carlson-Thies, Faith-Based Institutions Cooperating with Public Welfare: The
Promise of the Charitable Choice Provision, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 29, 30.
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the grante'es. 23 Religious organizations have several rights under
the statute. First, governmental entities cannot discriminate
against religious organizations in awarding contracts,24 nor can
they interfere with the religious organization's "control over the
definition, development, practice, and expression of its religious
beliefs."25 In addition, religious organizations receiving charitable
choice funds need not alter their internal governance structures or
remove religious art, icons, or other symbols from their premises. 26
Finally, religious organizations are exempt from Title VII's nondiscrimination in employment requirements. 27
Beneficiaries also have defined rights. States must provide
nonsectarian alternatives for beneficiaries who object to the religious character of their provider,28 although they are not required
to provide notice informing beneficiaries of this right.29 Moreover,
religious o~ganizations cannot discriminate against beneficiaries on
the basis of religion or religious beliefs.30 In addition, religious organizations cannot use charitable choice funds for proselytizing or
worship.3! With regard to accountability, the statute provides that
religious organizations are subject to the same regulations as other
contractors "to account in accord with generally accepted auditing
principles for the use of such funds," although the organization can
segregate federal funds into separate accounts and limit any audit
to those accounts. 32 Finally, the statute provides that any party

23. The provision states:
The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract with religious organizations, or to allow religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or
dther forms of disbursement under any program described in subsection (a)(2),
on the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without impairing
the religious character of such organizations, and without diminishing the, religious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded under such program.
§ 104(b), 110 Stat. at 2162 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. III 1997».
24. Id. § 104(c).
'
25. Id. § 104(d)(1).
26. Id. § 104(d)(2).
27. Id. § 104(f).
28. Id. § 104(e)(1).
29. The lack of a notice requirement has been criticized. "As a class, welfare beneficiaries
are not the most legally empowered group of people. Legislation that gives them rights without
notifying them makes these rights virtually useless." Julie A. Segal, A 'Holy Mistaken Zeal':
The Legislative History and Future of Charitable Choice, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 9, 15.
30. § 104(g), 110 Stat. at 2163.
31. Id. § 104(j).
32. Id. § 104(h).
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seeking to enforce its rights under section 104 may file a civil suit
for injunctive relief in state court.33
Despite the constitutional issues arising under charitable
choice and despite the fact that the PRA marked the first major
governmental initiative for direct funding of churches, charitable
choice received scant attention in either the legislative process or in
the media. Rather, most of the debate over the PRA focused on the
lifetime limits on the receipt of welfare benefits (no one can get welfare benefits for more than five years) and other provisions designed to alter the perceived behavior of welfare recipients. 34 Yet
attention has subsequently turned to charitable choice for two main
reasons. First, a scattering of lawsuits has challenged various aspects of charitable choice. For instance, a therapist who was fired
by a government-funded, religiously affiliated charity after it became public that she was homosexual is suing her former employer,
alleging that government-funded charitable organizations cannot
engage in religious discrimination. 35 In January 2002, a federal district court struck down a Wisconsin funding program that awarded
grants to a nonprofit organization called Faithworks, which provided long-term residential treatment to male drug and alcohol addicts. 36 The court concluded that the sectarian and secular aspects
of the program could not be separated and that, therefore, the program violated the Establishment Clause. 37 Second, during the 2000
presidential campaign, both candidates, then-Vice President Gore
and then-Governor Bush, endorsed the charitable choice concept
and argued for its expansion into other government programs. 38
Once he became President, Bush quickly announced the formation
of the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, designed to

33. Id. § 104(i). This is the only express right of enforcement for beneficiaries in the entire
PRA. Thus, while the statute claims to provide fair procedures and objective standards for eligibility, these provisions are likely unenforceable. See Gilman, supra note 19, at 625-3l.
34. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 103-08 (1998); Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 234-35 (2000).
35. The lawsuit brought by Alicia Pedreira, Pedreira v. Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children, No. 3:00CV-210-S, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10283 (W.D. Ky. Jui. 23, 2001), is described in
detail in Eyal Press, Faith-Based Furor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 62. The
status of other lawsuits is described in Elbert Lin et aI., Note, Faith in the Courts? The Legal and
Political Furture of Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 183, 191
n.54 (2002).
36. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 954 (W.D. Wis.
2002). This case is discussed in greater detail infra note 342.
37. Freedom from Religion Found., 179 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
38. See e.g., Ceci Connolly, Gore Urges Role for 'Faith-Based' Groups, WASH. POST, May 25,
1999, at A4; E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Shift Looms: The President Sees Consensus, While Religious
Leaders Disagree About the Church-State Divide, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1999, at Bl.
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expand charitable choice into other federal programs by boosting
funding and eliminating federal regulations that inhibit the participation of religious groups.39 Shortly thereafter, several members
of the House and Senate drafted legislation designed to expand
charitable choice into more than 100 programs in the Departments
of Labor, Justice, Education, and Housing and Urban Development. 40
Almost immediately, the proposed legislation attracted controversy. Voices that had been silent during the 1996 enactment of
the PRA quickly raised concerns about church-state separation, the
potential bureaucratization and co-optation of religious organizations, federally funded discrimination, and the funding of objectionable sects. Most surprisingly to the administration, heated opposition to the program was spearheaded by various evangelical organizations that feared they would be discriminated against in favor of
more mainstream religions. 41 Facing the maelstrom of objections,
the Senate responded by delaying introduction of the legislation for
up to a year while program kinks were worked out.42 A House bill
was subsequently passed on July 19, 2001, with some changes designed to meet public objections. 43 Nevertheless, the bill remained
mired in debates over the proposed exemption of faith-based providers from nondiscrimination laws. Late in 2001, Senators Lieberman and Santo rum began to work with the White House on
compromise legislation that focuses on improving tax incentives for
charitable giving rather than on expanding charitable choice. 44 Yet
even if charitable choice is not expanded through the legislative
process, President Bush has stated that he will pursue identical
goals through executive orders and administrative changes. 45

39. Exec. Order No. 13,198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8,497 (Jan. 31, 2001).
40. H.R. 7, lO7th Congo (2001); see also Dana Milbank & Thomas B. Edsall, Faith Initiative
May Be Revised; Criticism Surprises Administration, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2001, at AI.
41. Milbank & Edsall, supra note 40. At the same time, some religious groups opposed potential funding of nonmainstream religions. Don Lattin, Bush Courts Right to Back Program:
But Falwell Urges President to Withhold Social Service Funding from Islamic Groups, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 8, 2001, at A4.
42. See Elizabeth Becker, Senate Delays Legislation on Aid to Church Charities, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2001, at A22; Richard Benedetto, Bush's 'Faith-Based' Initiative Draws Foes from Several Sides, USA TODAY, May 8, 2001, at A9.
43. H.R. 7; see Juliet Eilperin, Faith-Based Initiative Wins House Approval, WASH. POST,
July 20, 2001, at AI.
44. Mary Leonard, Faith Bill Advances Amid Religious Mood; Administration Yields on Expanding Grants, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 2001, at AI.
45. Mike Allen, 'Faith Based' Backup Plan; Agencies to Lower Barriers to Social Services
Contracts, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2001, at A2; Dana Milbank, Bush Urges Senators to Act on
Faith Bill, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2001, at A4.
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The idea of relying on religious groups to alleviate poverty
and other social problems is not new. Religious groups have a long
history of aiding the disadvantaged, and their efforts have shaped
modern bureaucratic notions of relief for the poor. 46 In addition,
throughout Western history, governments and private entities, including religious groups, have had an intertwined, and sometimes
collaborative, relationship in providing social welfare. 47 In the
twentieth century, government has extensively funded religiously
affiliated nonprofit groups, as long as those groups were not "pervasively sectarian."48 For instance, government funding accounts for
39% of the budget of Lutheran Services, 62% of Catholic Charities,
and 18% of the Salvation Army.49 Indeed, government relies on private entities of all types to deliver the bulk of this country's human
services. 50 However, charitable choice takes this public/private relationship to a new level by allowing direct government funding of
sectarian organizations. 51 That is, religious organizations no longer
need to set up separate, secular nonprofits to receive federal funds.
Churches, synagogues, mosques, and the like can receive funds directly.52

46. See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR MIX 7·9 (1996) ("Religiously mo·
tivated and religiously based organizations have historically played a vital role in one area of
public service after another."); Donald T. Critchlow & Charles H. Parker, Introduction to WITH
Us ALWAYS: A HISTORY OF PRIVATE CHARITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 2 (Donald T. Critchlow &
Charles H. Parker eds., 1998) ("Despite all the waves of welfare reform in Europe from the six·
teenth century to the present day, religious charity has continued to play an important role in
social provision for the poor. Even though the aim of helping the poor move out of poverty is often
expressed today as a moral (if not religious) obligation, this ideal comes from a long tradition of
Christian religious charity.").
47. See SALAMON, supra note 14, at 33·34; Critchlow & Parker, supra note 46, at 3 (noting
that "a strict dichotomy between public assistance and private charity is far too simplistic").
48. See Griener, supra note 20, at 1-2; Murphy, supra note 5. The "pervasively sectarian"
standard is discussed infra notes 321-29 and accompanying text.
49. See MONSMA, supra note 46, at 1; Mark Silk, Old Alliance, New Ground Rules, WASH.
POST, Feb. 18, 2001, at B3.
50. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 15, 41-43.
51. Historically, churches and other religious congregations have not been eligible to provide federally funded welfare services. See Griener, supra note 20, at 1-2. As of 1998, the National Congregations Study found that only three percent of the country's 300,000 congregations
run government-funded programs, although almost all of them provide some form of social service such as feeding the hungry or building houses for the poor. Silk, supra note 49. However, in
the wake of cllaritable choice, many churches have expressed interest in applying for government
funds, and several states and cities have begun aggressive campaigns to educate religious groups
about available government funds. States with particularly active collaborations with faith-based
organizations include Indiana, Texas, and Wisconsin. Griener, supra note 20, at 3.
52. Prior to the PRA, there were some federal programs with charitable choice-type provisions, i.e., provisions that allowed for federal funding without requiring the grantee to alter its
religious character. For instance, since 1990, houses of worship have been eligible to accept federal funds to provide day care to low-income children. The federal refugee settlement program
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Charitable choice is the result of several converging trends,
all of which are breaking down the already blurry boundaries between public and private, religious and secular. As already noted,
government funding of private entities to provide social services has
been a dominant model in this country since at least the 1960s. Religious organizations, with their long history of charitable works,
are demanding equal treatment and equal access to government
funds. Their demands fit within the Supreme Court's recent doctrinal shift towards equal treatment of sectarian and nonsectarian
groups in interpreting the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. 53 In
addition, America is a religious country. Over ninety percent of
Americans say they pray at least once a week, and forty percent
attend church weekly.54 The public thus views religious organizations as viable mechanisms for creating social change. 55
Layered on top of these trends is the burgeoning privatization movement,56 which promises lower costs and greater efficiencies 57 and which has become an increasingly popular method of
state and local governance. Privatization is controversial and
marked by sharp philosophical differences over the proper scope
and role of government. 58 Privatization advocates claim that in addition to cost savings, contracting out social services puts services
closer to the people served and allows private providers to act as

and the overseas emergency relief and development assistance program also have provided funds
to religious organizations. Carlson-Thies, supra note 22, at 47.
53. See infra Part IV.
54. NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUMBIA UNIV., supra note 9, at 6.
55. Nevertheless, a poll of the public about charitable choice revealed that while Americans
favor the idea of charitable choice, they are opposed to specific portions of the plan, including
allowing funding of nonmainstream religions and permissible hiring discrimination on the basis
of religion. Laurie Goodstein, Support for Religion-Based Plan Is Hedged, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2001, at A14.
56. The term "privatization" can have many meanings, from complete load-shedding, in
which a government divests itself completely from performing a service, to contracting out, in
which the government pays a private provider to provide a former government function. In this
Article, privatization is used in the latter sense. Other types of privatization initiatives include
long-term leases, franchises, joint ventures, vouchers, and volunteerism. See Adrian Moore &
Wade Hudson, The Evolution of Privatization Practices and Strategies, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT
INNOVATION: ISSUES AND TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGED COMPETITION 17, 18-20
(Robin A. Johnson & Norman Walzer eds., 2000).
57. See, e.g., EMMANUEL SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION 288 (1987) (arguing that privatization satisfies "society's needs ... more effectively, and equitably").
58. See, e.g., Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE
STATE 15, 42-44 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1989) (arguing that privatization
proponents "call into doubt the nation's capacity and will for collective provision").
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mediating forces between government and citizens. 59 Especially
with regard to faith-based organizations, advocates contend that
"congregations are value-generating and value-maintaining ... because they foster strong supportive affiliations and networks within
communities across the nation."60 Opponents challenge these empirical notions about cost and efficiency and question whether the
government should contract out services for its most vulnerable and
voiceless citizens. 61 For the actual state and local officials making
the decisions to privatize, the issues are less philosophical and focus more on pragmatic concerns such as the cost pressures engendered by shrinking municipal budgets. 62
Social service privatization has boomed since the 1960s,
when federal funds for poor relief programs bega.n to bypass state
and local governments and go directly to private providers. 63 Later,
in the late 1970s and the 1980s, state and local governments became interested in contracting out their own functions in response
to shrinking budgets. 64 They started by privatizing various municipal services such as trash hauling, asphalt paving, and road construction, but soon privatized various health and human services,
as they gained comfort with this form of management. 65 The increase in privatization initiatives, coupled with a growing sense

59. Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Continuing the Discussion and Taking a Stand,
in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 58, at 261, 261-62 (summarizing view of
privatization proponents); Starr, supra note 58, at 26 (same).
60. Greiner, supra note 20, at 2.
61. Kamerman & Kahn, supra note 59, at 262-65.
62. Ruth Hoogland DeHoog & Lana Stein, Municipal Contracting in the 1980s: Tinkering or
Reinventing Government, in CONTRACTING OUT GOVERNMENT SERVICES 26, 32 (Paul Seidenstat
ed., 1999).
63. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 221-22; see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE
POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 267 (1996) (describing the federal government's "community action" strategy of bypassing local politicians and funding community
agencies directly). Starting with the New Deal, the federal government began to fund massive
social programs, but largely contracted with the states to carry them out. Funding of private
entities began in earnest in the 1960s. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 223; Arnold Gurin, Governmental Responsibility and Privatization: Examples from Four Social Services, in PRIVATIZATION
AND THE WELFARE STATE, supra note 58, at 179, 180-81.
64. Robin A. Johnson & Norman Walzer, Introduction and Overview, in LoCAL
GOVERNMENT INNOVATION: ISSUES AND TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGED COMPETITION,
supra note 56, at I, 5. "Among cities reporting a study of the feasibility of privatization in the
past five years, 90.7% said internal attempts to decrease costs of service delivery was the main
factor causing them to consider. privatization. The second most important factor, reported by
49.6% of respondents, is external fiscal pressures such as restrictions placed on the ability to
raise taxes." Robin A. Johnson & Norman Walzer, Privatization and Managed Competition:
Management Fad or Long-Term Systemic Change for Cities?, in LoCAL GOVERNMENT
INNOVATION: ISSUES AND TRENDS IN PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGED COMPETITION, supra note 56,
at 169, 177.
65. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 17-18.
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that religious groups have valuable resources to offer in solving
human and public crises, have converged in the push for expanding
charitable choice throughout government programs.
.

II. ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT, NONPROFIT, AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

Accountability is generally understood to mean that one entity has the power to reward or punish another entity for the latter's performance. 66 In the social service context, the vast number of
stakeholders results in a complex web of interrelationships, with
each stakeholder demanding fealty to differing goals. In the welfare
context, the rhetoric of accountability usually centers on holding
welfare recipients accountable to the taxpaying public that supports
them. That is, clients are expected to work and are denied welfare
benefits if they fail to do so. The government and direct service providers are also deemed accountable to the public for achieving "results" in the form of lower welfare rolls. There is far less focus on
holding government and providers accountable to recipients to ensure that these "clients" receive quality services, whether they be
job training services, mental health counseling, or the like. However, without quality social services, the underlying goals of the
PRA and other social welfare statutes cannot be achieved. Thus, it
is imperative that social service providers be held accountable to
clients and the public for delivering meaningful and effective services.
As a matter of law, the legal tools that can be used to improve service quality differ radically based on whether the provider
is a government agency, for-profit corporation, nonprofit entity, or
religious organization. The mission of administrative law is to hold
government agencies accountable to the public, given that agencies
are not democratically elected bodies. Thus, administrative law centers on limiting agency discretion by enforcing norms of fairness,
openness, and judicial review. By contrast, corporate law has never
embodied these norms because corporations have never been
deemed accountable to the public at large, but rather, only to their
own shareholders. In corporate law, accountability comes largely

66. See William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and Accountability in an Era of Standards-Based School Reform, 12 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 301, 301-02 (2001) (proposing a strategy
to hold states and schools accountable to communities, parents, and students for achieving the
goals of standards-based reform). "[A]n accountability system must answer the question of 'accountability of whom to whom for what and how.' .. Id. at 303.
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through a fiduciary model. .The law governing nonprofits is based
on the corporate law model, even though nonprofits do not share
the hallmark of ownership interests. This inexact fit is one reason
why nonprofits have long faced an accountability challenge. Religious organizations have even fewer external and internal constraints on their discretion. This is particularly troubling when religious organizations are managing public funds.
As described in the remainder of this part, different accountability mechanisms apply to government agencies, nonprofits and
religious organizations. This part concludes that no one legal form
is a guarantee of quality service delivery, although there are more
avenues of recourse for wronged beneficiaries of governmental programs and fewer for beneficiaries of church-based programs. Thus,
as this part demonstrates, in spending public money, governments
need to put in place measures to promote accountability regardless
of who is delivering the services.

A. Holding Government Agencies Accountable
The law treats public and private actors differently, as the
two following cases illustrate. In Boulet v. Cellucci, a proposed class
of mentally retarded persons sued Massachusetts state officials
charged with administering the Medicaid program. 67 The plaintiffs
alleged that the officials had failed to provide them with statutorily
required residential habilitation services, for which the plaintiffs
had been on a waiting list for as many as ten years, in violation of
the Medicaid statute's "reasonable promptness" requirement. The
court certified the class and ordered the state to provide the class
members with the required services within ninety days.
In Graves v. Narcotics Service Counsel, Inc., the plaintiff
sued a nonprofit halfway house and its employees for failing to
properly treat him for his drug addiction and for prematurely releasing him from a drug detoxification program. 68 The court held
that the suit could not go forward because the defendants were not
state actors and thus could not be charged with any constitutional
or federal statutory violations. Even though federal and state funding supported the nonprofit, and even though the state regulated
the nonprofit, these connections were insufficient to deem the nonprofit's actions as having arisen "under color oflaw."

67. 107 F. Supp. 2d 61,82 (D. Mass. 2000).
68. 605 F. Supp. 1285, 1287 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
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The results in these two cases hinged solely on the fact that
government actors were the defendants in the first case, while ostensibly private actors were the defendants in the second. This public/private distinction drives the analysis not only in the area of alleged constitutional and federal statutory violations, but also in the
application of administrative laws and other doctrines designed to
constrain official discretion. As a result, when private actors administer public funds, they face far fewer constraints upon their discretion than do their governmental counterparts. As this section explains, the public/private divide is built upon a fiction that is no
longer appropriate in today's mixed social service delivery network.
1. Section 1983: Holding Government Accountable to Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Requirements

Section 1983,69 the statute invoked in both Boulet and
Graves, protects individuals from violations of constitutional and
federal statutory rights committed by state actors. It reaches only
those deprivations of federal rights that occur "under color of law,"
and excludes" 'inerely private conduct no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.' "70 Under current Supreme Court doctrine,
private actors are rarely deemed to be acting under color of state
law. In analyzing alleged state action, the Supreme Court primarily considers two factors: the degree of state involvement with the
challenged private action and whether the private actor is carrying
out a public function. Thus, state action exists where the state
" 'has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be
deemed to be that of the State'''71 (the nexus analysis) or where a
private entity is carrying out a function traditionally and exclusively performed by the state (the public function analysis).72

69. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
70. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
(1948». The Court has justified the state action requirement as necessary to preserve a sphere of
individual freedom and to avoid holding states liable for conduct "for whicb they cannot fairly be
hlamed." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
71. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999) (quoting Jackson v. Metro.
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974».
72. [d. at 55-56. More recently, the Court announced yet another possible avenue for finding
state action--entwineme·nt. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S.
288, 303 (2001) (holding that state interscholastic athletic association whose members are mostly
public school personnel and that is governed by board consisting of state officials is state actor
because "relevant facts show pervasive entwinement to the point of largely overlapping identity"). The Court, however, distinguished the facts of the case from those involving "mere public
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With regard to the nexus question, the courts have long held
that not only is government regulation insufficient to convert private action into public action, but also that "the mere existence of a
contract between a governmental agency and a private party is insufficient to create state action."73 Indeed, two Supreme Court cases
in which state and. local government agencies contracted with private providers to offer educational or health services held that state
action did not exist even where the government extensively regulated and almost exclusively funded the private entities. 74 As a result, for state action to arise in a contracting scheme, the government agency essentially must direct a specific course of action from
the private provider. Yet because social service privatization is designed to increase .innovation and efficiency, government agencies
generally have a hands-off approach, which allows for substantial
independence by front-line workers. 75 Thus, the nexus test is
unlikely to provide relief for plaintiffs wronged by violations of federal statutory or constitutional law committed by private, government-funded social service entities. As for the public function test,
the Court has held that the function at issue must be one traditionally and exclusively performed by government. 76 In the social services area, an intertwined network of governmental, nonprofit, and
religious providers has long provided benefits,77 thus seemingly
foreclosing this avenue for finding state action. In sum, private so-

buyers of contract services, whose payments for services rendered do not convert the service
providers into public actors." Id. at 299. Thus, it is unlikely an entwinement analysis would
apply to a contracting scenario. See infra note 74.
73. Dobyns v. E-Systems, Inc., 667 F.2d 1219, 1227 (5th Cir. 1982); Simescu v. Emmet
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir. 1991).
74. Blum, 457 U.s. at 1002; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 831-34 (1982). In Blum,
the Court held that nursing homes that accepted Medicaid funding were not state actors, even
though the state subsidized the costs of the nursing homes, extensively regulated the operation
of the nursing homes, required the nursing homes to periodically assess the appropriate level of
care for residents, paid the medical expenses of more than ninety percent of the patients, and
licensed the facilities. 457 U.S. at 1004-09. The Court reasoned that the state could not be liable
for the independent, professional judgments of the nursing home doctors. Id. at 1008. In RendellBaker, the Court held that a private, nonprofit school which served special needs students under
contract with the local public school district was not a state actor even where public funds accounted for ninety percent of the school's funding, the school was regulated by the state and local
school districts, and the school operated pursuant to a written contract with the local school
system and state agencies. 457 U.S. at 831-34.
75. This devolution of discretion to front-line workers is a hallmark of the PRA, regardless
of whether the front-line workers are public or private. See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in
Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1121, 1126-27 (2000); Gilman, supra note 19, at 579-8l.
76. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 55-56; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
77. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
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cial service contractors are unlikely to be deemed state actors under
current contracting arrangements. 78
2. Holding Government Agencies Accountable Through
Administrative Law
Administrative law doctrines are also of limited help to social service beneficiaries in privatized jurisdictions. The bulk of our
administrative law is focused on restraining abuses of the discretionary power held by administrative agencies, in recognition of the
fact that agencies are run by nonelected officials who are not directly accountable to citizens. 79 Thus, the federal Administrative
Procedure Act 80 and its state counterparts 81 (an "APA") focus on ensuring that government decisions are fairly and consistently made,
with opportunities for public input-whether these decisions are
implemented through individualized hearings or broad regulatory
provisions. 82 However, APAs generally apply only to agencies, and
the definitions of "agency" do not include private entities. 83
78. For some criticisms of the Court's state action doctrine-and there are many-see generally Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1169 (1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985);
Gilman, supra note 19, at 614-20; Robert J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 221; Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis
in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 318 (1995); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347 (1963).
79. See 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 17.1, at 1231 (4th ed.
1994) ("Much of administrative law is a response to the existence of broad discretionary power in
government officials."); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 546 (2000) ("Unsurprisingly, administrative law scholarship has organized itself largely
around the need to defend the administrative state against accusations of illegitimacy, principally by emphasizing mechanisms that render agencies indirectly accountable to the electorate,
such as legislative and executive oversight and judicial review.").
80. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
81. 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE § 2.31(2) (2d ed. 1997)
("Today every state has a body of legislation dealing with administrative procedure and control.").
82. Diller, supra note 75, at 1189.
83. The definition of agency in the federal APA is "each authority of the Government of the
United States." § 551(1). The definitions of "agency" in the various state APAs also have been
interpreted not to include private entities. See, e.g., Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 399 (Iowa
1989) (holding that a nonprofit organization that contracted with state to perform farm mediation services was not an agency); League Gen. Ins. v. Catastrophic Claims, 458 N.W.2d 632, 639
(Mich. 1990) (holding that an unincorporated, nonprofit association of private insurers was not
an agency under state's APA); Dorris v. Mo. Substance Abuse Counselors' Certification Bd., Inc.,
10 SW.3d 557, 560-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a private substance abuse counselors'
certification organization was not an agency under state Administrative Procedures Act); Ins.
Premium Fin. Assoc. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Ins., 668 N.E.2d 399, 403 (N.Y. 1996) (holding that a
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Thus, when a private contractor conducts individualized
hearings or establishes generally applicable policies, the contractor
need not abide by administrative law requirements for notice,
comment, or hearings in the absence of contrary statutory or contractuallanguage. In addition, when government agencies choose to
contract out services, that decision itself is usually exempted from
review, as is any regulatory guidance or contract terms governing
the private contractors.B4 In short, contracting out has long been
viewed as an internal, housekeeping matter with few ramifications
on the public at large. While this rationale may have had validity
when governments were buying paper clips or copy machine maintenance contracts, it lacks legitimacy when governments are buying
complex social services. Nevertheless, it is the governing paradigm
in this area. Additionally, even if contracting fell within the scope
of state APA laws, most local governments-the locus of most social
service contracting-do not have APA equivalents and are not subject to state APA laws. B5 Thus, even a more expansive conception of
"agency" in state APA law would play little role in social service
privatization.
In addition to the APAs, a variety of other administrative
law statutes ensure openness in the government decisionmaking

privately operated automobile insurance plan was not a state agency); cf. MeriWeather Inc. v.
Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 778 A.2d 1038 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000), (holding that a nonprofit community economic development corporation was an agency because it was the alter ego of a public
agency), affd, 778 A.2d 1006 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); Bruggeman v. S.D. Chem. Dependency
Counselor Certification Bd., 571 N,W.2d 851, 853 (S.D. 1997) (holding that a nonprofit certification board was an agency where state APA defined "agency" as including an "agent of the state
vested with the authority to exercise any portion of the state's sovereignty").
84. This is because the contracts themselves are not treated as "rules" under the APAs. The
federal APA broadly defines a "rule" as an "agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency ...." § 551(4). Rules are subject
to public notice and consideration of public comment. ld. § 553. However, the federal APA exempts all matters "relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans,
grants, benefits or contracts," from notice and comment requirements. ld. § 553(a)(2).
The 1981 Model State APA has a similar definition of "rule." MODEL STATE ADMIN.
PROCEDURE ACT § 1-102(10) (1981) ("[T]he whole or a part of an agency statement of general
applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes (i) law or policy, or (ii) the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency."). The Model State APA also exempts from
notice and comment requirements those rules relating solely to agency internal management, id.
§ 3-116(1), and rules for establishing criteria for negotiating commercial arrangements. ld. § 3116(2).
85. 1 KOCH, supra note 81, § 2.32(3) (stating that local government agencies have both legislative and administrative characteristics).
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process. These include freedom of information acts,86 which require
governments to make their files available to the public, and sunshine laws,87 which open agency meetings to the public. Here too,
however, private entities rarely fall within the definition of
"agency."88 To the contrary, "[i]n most situations, private economic
or social conduct is not subject to procedural or substantive constraint akin to the procedural due process norms and the arbitrary
and capricious standards that apply to government action."89
Clearly, the divide in administrative and constitutional law
between public and private bears little resemblance to the reality of
modern governance. Boundaries between public and private are
quickly disappearing as a result of current market-oriented reforms
in which the "private sector [is substituted] for regulatory regimes"
and "public agencies use market approaches, structures and incentives to achieve their regulatory goals."90 Welfare reform, prison
privatization, charter schools, and privatized child welfare services
are only some of the more high-profile delegations of public functions to the private sector.91 Particularly in the social services field,
the government relies more on private entities to carry out publicly

86. The federal Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") is at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994). There are
nine statutory exemptions to the open records requirement. Id. § 553(b). All states and the Dis·
trict of Columbia also have open records statutes. 1 KOCH, supra note 81, § 3.40.
87. The federal law is called the Government in the Sunshine Act, and is found at 5 U.S.C. §
552b (1994). It gives the public access to observe agency meetings, although it does not provide a
basis for public participation in those meetings. Every state also has a similar law. See 1 KOCH,
supra note 81, § 3.61(1).
88. The FOIA definition of "agency" is found in the APA at 5 U.S.C. § 551(1). The definition
of agency in the "Government in the Sunshine Act" is found at 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1). In Forsham
v. Harris, the Court held that the definition of agency under ForA did not include private parties
contracting with the government. Federal grants "generally do not create a partnership or joint
venture with the recipient, nor do they serve to convert the acts of the recipient from private acts
to governmental acts absent extensive, detailed, and virtually day-to-day supervision." 445 U.S.
169, 180 (1980). See generally Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act:
An Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21
(1999) (discussing the impact of ForA on private entities and the public's ability to gather information from them).
89. Jack Beerman, The Reach of Administrative Law in the United States, in THE PROVINCE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 171, 186 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
90. See Alfred C. Arnan, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, supra note 89, at 90, 90. For an example of the attempts of public agencies
to adopt market-oriented strategies to improve accountability, see the Gore Commission's National Performance Review published in September 1993. VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, FROM RED
TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS (Report of the
National Performance Review, 1993).
91. See generally Susan Vivian Mangold, Protections, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster
Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1295 (1999) (discussing the need for regulatory reform for private
foster care); Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
531 (1989) (discussing legal issues in the incarceration area).
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funded programs than it directly provides itself, and these private
entities rely more on government funds than monies from any other
source. 92 Moreover, lines are not only blurring between private and
public, but also between for-profit and nonprofit, and religious and
secular.93 The law, however, remains steadfastly committed to outdated boundaries.
3. The Effectiveness of Expanding Government-Constraining
Doctrines to Private Parties
The question obviously arises whether constitutional and
administrative law constraints should be extended to private entities. Preliminarily, it should be noted that even in the purely public
sphere, the discretion-constraining mechanisms provided by § 1983
enforcement and administrative law are far from foolproof. The case
law analyzing § 1983 is riddled with often-insurmountable hurdles
for plaintiffs. For instance, in § 1983 law, there is no respondeat
superior liability,94 negligence is not grounds for liability,95 governmental officials have various immunities from suit,96 and states
cannot be sued. 97 In addition, the Constitution only protects individuals from affirmative governmental acts, while governmental
negligence that results in private harm is not actionable. 98 Moreover, while state action doctrine can enforce constitutional procedural due process norms agairtst state actors, it does not reach substantive issues of service quality.99

92. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 15. "Indeed, piecing together research on the private role in
social service provision as well as private contributions to standard setting and to implementation and enforcement produces a picture of governance strikingly at odds with the hierarchical,
agency centered model of decision making that now dominates administrative law." Freeman,
supra note 79, at 592-93.
93. See generally Martha Minow, Lecture: Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061
(2000) (discussing the ever-shifting lines between private and nonprofit prganizations). For a
description of the increasing ties between the nonprofit and for-profit sectors, see generally To
PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 2000).
94. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
95. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (holding that negligence is not enough for
deprivation of property claim).
96. See generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE
LAw OF SECTION 1983 chs. 7 & 8 (4th ed. 1999).
97. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
98. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1989).
99. Freeman, supra note 79, at 602.
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Likewise, the utility of APAs to constrain the discretion of
governmental actors is lessened in the current social service environment, in which discretion is pushed downward to front-line
workers.lOO Regulations are playing less of a role in defining substantive program standards and, as a result, individualized hearings have less force because standards are not clearly articulated.
Further, while APAs open the door for the public to participate in
decisionmaking processes, they do not encourage participation.
That is, they provide no incentives or assistance for the public to
participate. lOl Thus, extension of these doctrines to private entities
would not necessarily solve the accountability challenge.l°2 However, the basic principles underlying these doctrines-fairness,
equality, openness, and consistency-are surely principles we want
in a social service delivery system, regardless of the legal form of
the entity providing the service.

B. The Limited Accountability Inherent in Nonprofit Organizations

In analyzing the accountability dilemma, it is not sufficient
simply to note the lack of government-constraining doctrines in privatized social service systems. Rather, it is essential to analyze
what, if any, accountability mechanisms inhere in the various legal
structures of private entities. Just as government entities are subject to various public-ordering doctrines, private entities are subject
to their own doctrinal constraints. Accordingly, this part explores
the legal and nonlegal constraints on nonprofit entities in general,
and religious organizations in particular, to examine the accountability mechanisms that apply to these organizations and to gauge
their effectiveness. This part concludes that nonprofits and, to even
a greater degree, religious organizations operate with a remarkable

100. Under the PRA, states are expressly granting front·line workers increased discretion in
awarding benefits. Diller, supra note 75, at 1147-48. "Under the administrative framework
emerging today, many important policy determinations are not embodied in written rules of
general applicability" and thus "notice and comment requirements do not provide an effective
avenue for public input." Id. at 1196.
101. See Nancy Perkins Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the
New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263,
269 (1999) ("[The APA) was conservative in that it forced the public to take steps to become involved in the decisionmaking process.").
102. Extension of APA requirements to private parties might end up being so costly as to
eliminate any of the supposed benefits of privatization in the first place. "On a more philosophical level, the question that also arises is whether the kinds of values protected by public law are
capable of being translated primarily into an efficiency discourse." Aman, supra note 90, at 100.

2002]

"CHARITABLE CHOICE"

823

degree of freedom that comes at a cost to public accountability, especially when these entities are providing publicly-funded services.
1. The Scope of the Nonprofit Sector

The nonprofit sector is huge. There are over one million nonprofit organizations in this country, more than 700,000 of which are
classified by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") as religious or
charitable. 103 Their annual aggregate revenues constitute about
15% of the nation's gross national product, and they employ 6.9% of
the work force. 104 In the social service arena, nonprofits and government are intertwined and interdependent. Social service nonprofits, which constitute the largest component of the nonprofit sector, "deliver a larger share of the services government finances than
do government agencies themselves."!05 Indeed, government is not,
and never has been, the primary deliverer of social services, despite
the rhetoric of government downsizing. Rather, there is an "extensive pattern of government-nonprofit cooperation in the delivery of
human services, with government functioning as the financier and
the nonprofit sector as the deliverers of the services."!06
What does "nonprofit" mean? While nonprofits are allowed to
make money, they are bound by the nondistribution constraint:
they must use any profits for their charitable purposes and may not
distribute profits to their members or other individuals with control
over the organization. 107 Not all nonprofits are exempt from federal
income taxes; rather, tax exemption is a determination made by the
IRS under federal tax law. lOB In addition to exemptions from federal
income taxes, tax-exempt charities are also usually exempt from
various state and local income, property, sales, use, excise, payroll,
/,

103. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, u.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PuB. No. 55B, INDEPENDENT
SECTOR, THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC IN BRIEF: FACTS AND FIGURES ON THE INDEPENDENT
SECTOR (2001); NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE, at vii (Victor Futter &
George W. Overton eds., 1997).
104. See NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE, supra note 103, at vii; LESTER
M. SALAMON & HELMUT K. ANHEIER, THE EMERGING NONPROFIT SECTOR 34 (1996).
105. SALAMON, supra note 14, at 134. Social service organizations make up the largest component of the nonprofit sector at fifty-two percent. See Salamon, supra note 13, at 136-37.
106. Salamon, supra note 13, at 141; see also STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY,
NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF CONTRACTING 4 (1993) ("[M]ost nonprofit service organizations depend on government support for over half of their revenues: for
many, government support comprises their entire budget.").
107. Henry B. Hansma,nn, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
108. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAw OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3-4 (7th ed. 1998).
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and other forms of taxation. I09 Also, contributions to many types of
tax-exempt organizations are themselves deductible by donors, thus
fueling much of the financing of nonprofit work. l1
In light of their favored status, nonprofits have long had to
account to the public for their conduct. During the 1990s, accountability concerns increased following a string of high-profile scandals
within the nonprofit community. For instance, in 1991, William
Aramony, the head of the United Way, was convicted of theft after
the press revealed that he used United Way funds for his personal
benefit, including renting limousines and flying on the Concorde.
He was also accused of rewarding friends and family members with
jobs, board memberships, and consulting contracts.1 11 Similarly, in
1997, the New York State Board of Regents removed eighteen of
nineteen trustees of Adelphi University for unreasonably compensating the University's president; he earned $523,000 and was
given trips abroad and the use of a Manhattan apartment. 112
Most recently, the Red Cross faced intense public criticism in
the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Following the attacks, the Red
Cross collected over $543 million from donors who intended that the
funds be used for victim relief.113 However, the Red Cross decided to
reserve a large portion of the funds for future emergencies.1 14 In
addition, the Red Cross refused to participate in a computerized
database established to coordinate charitable efforts, moved slowly
to disburse funds to victims, and was forced to destroy part of its

°

109. Bazil Facchina et aI., Privileges and Exemptions Enjoyed by Nonprofit Organizations, 28
U.S.F. L. REV. 85, 85-86 (1993). Other benefits include: exemptions in trade regulation laws that
permit nonprofits to purchase goods on terms not available to others; exemptions from Federal
Trade Commission scrutiny; exemptions from certain labor regulations concerning collective
bargaining and workers' compensation; and preferred postal rates. Id. In addition, bankruptcy,
copyright, civil rights, and criminal laws allow nonprofits to engage in certain forms of conduct
prohibited for others. Id. at 86.
110. However, the major sources of nonprofit funding (for nonmembership charities) are
funds derived from fees, dues, and charges for services provided. JAMES J. FlSHMAN & STEPHEN
SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANlZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (2d ed. 2000). Government
funding is the next major source, with private funding third. Id.
111. Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law,
and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 593-94 (1999); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary
Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J.
CORP. L. 631, 633 (1998).
112. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1401 (1998);
Gary, supra note 111, at 593-94.
113. Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, A Nation Challenged: The Red Cross; Red Cross
Pledges Entire Terror Fund to Sept. 11 Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at AI.
114.Id.
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blood bank after overcollecting blood donations.1I5 On top of this,
the media was awash in stories of victims' families being forced to
navigate an unwieldy maze of relief efforts.1I6 Public scrutiny and
threats from the New York Attorney General resulted in the resignation of the charity's chief executive officer, a decision to participate in the computer database, a recommitment of funds for direct
assistance to victims, and a frenzied public relations campaign to
repair the charity's tattered image.ll7
Some religious organizations have been rocked by scandals
as well. Pat Robertson was accused of improperly using funds from
his Christian Broadcast Network to promote his 1988 bid for the
presidency.1I8 Jim and Tammy Bakker were ordered to repay the
PTL Club for several million dollars they misappropriated and
spent on excessive saiaries.l I9 The Christian Science Church lost
$325 million in a misguided attempt to diversify, prompting calls
for the board's resignation.l 20 Given that most nonprofits enjoy exemption from federal and state income and other taxes, and given
that they are the recipients of vast sums of monetary donations and
volunteer services, pressure has mounted on nonprofits to justify
their favored status in light of these and other serious fiduciary
breaches. I2I

115. Katharine Q. Seelye & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charity; Red
Cross President Quits, Saying that the Board Left Her No Other Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2001, at B9; Lena H. Sun, Red Cross to Give All Funds to Victims; Contrite Charity Changes
Course on Sept. 11 Donations, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at AI.
116. David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charities; Charity
Abundant, But So Is Red Tape, After Terror Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at AI.
117. David France & David Noonan, Blood and Money, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 52,53;
Sun, supra note 115, at AI.
118. Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the 'Home Front' for Charitable Organizations,
29 N.M. L. REV. 1, 26 (1999).
119. In re Heritage Vill. Church & Missionary Fellowship, 92 B.R. 1000, 1010-11, 1016-22
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1988).
120. Regina E. Herzlinger, Effective Oversight: A Guide for Nonprofit Directors, in
NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE, supra note 103, at 13, 13.
121. Crimm, supra note 118, at 1-4. Two other constituencies challenging the favored status
of nonprofits are state and local governments and small businesses. Local governments are looking at nonprofits as potential revenue sources and are considering eliminating their exemptions
from a variety of taxes. Id. at 2-3. Also, small businesses who often compete directly with nonprofits for customers are also seeking to revoke some of the tax advantages of nonprofit status.
To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR,
supra note 93, at 4.
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2. Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors
Most nonprofits organize under state law as corporations in
order to gain the benefits of corporate status, such as limited liability and flexible governance.1 22 Like for-profit corporations, charitable corporations are typically governed by a board of directors and
managed on a day-to-day basis by officers. 123 In addition, the twin
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty that govern for-profit corporate
decisionmakers also govern nonprofit corporate decisionmakers. 124
The duty of care concerns director and officer competence. 125
Pursuant to the duty of care, directors and officers must act (1) in
good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of

122. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 60, 63. The corporate form is also preferred because it is recognized as an acceptable legal form by the IRS for tax-exempt status. [d. at 60. The
state laws governing the formation of nonprofit corporations vary widely. [d. at 65-66. For instance, some states set up specific categories of nonprofits, and others subsume nonprofits into
their general corporate law. [d. The nondistribution constraint, however, remains the defining
feature of nonprofits. [d. at 63.
123. All boards, both for-profit and nonprofit, have six principal purposes:
(1) to select, encourage, advise, evaluate and, if need be, replace the chief executive officer; (2) to review and adopt long-term strategic directions and to approve specific objectives, financial and other, such as reviewing the basic mission of the organization in light of changed circumstances; (3) to ensure to the
extent possible that the necessary resources, including human resources, will
be available to pursue the strategies and achieve the organization's objectives;
(4) to monitor the performance of management; (5) to ensure that the organization operates responsibly as well as effectively; and (6) to nominate suitable
candidates for election to the board, and to establish and carry out an effective
system of governance at the board level, including evaluation of board performance.
[d. at 145-46.
124. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT ("RMNCA") introductory cmt. at xxxv (1987).
Fiduciary duties are governed by state law. In general, the fiduciary duties of nonprofits are
derived from corporate principles rather than trust principles. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 21 (George W. Overton ed., 1993) ("The Duties of Care and Loyalty
are the common terms for the standards which guide all actions a director takes. These standards are derived from a century of litigation principally involving business corporations and are
equally applicable to nonprofit corporations."); Brody, supra note 112, at 1426-27.
However, some have argued that these corporate doctrines do not fit the nonprofit world. See,
e.g., Avner Ben-Ner, Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector? Reforming Law and Public Policy
Towards Nonprofit Organizations, 104 YALE L.J. 731, 756 (1994). This is because for-profit board
members have a defined goal of maximizing shareholder profits, whereas in the nonprofit world,
it is far less clear "whose objectives they should pursue [and] whom they should represent." [d. at
756-57.
125. RMNCA, supra note 124, §§ 8.30, 8.42 & cmts. These fiduciary duties also apply to officers, those individuals who carry out the day-to-day missions of the organization. [d. § 8.42 &
cmt.
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the corporation. 126 A director "need not exhaustively research every
issue personally" to meet this standard. 127 Rather, directors may
rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements of other board
members, employees, and legal counsel as long as the directors believe the source to be reliable and competent.l 28 Moreover, directors
are protected from honest mistakes of judgment. Pursuant to the
business judgment rule (sometimes called the best judgment rule in
the nonprofit context), directors are protected from liability for decisions that are rational, without a conflict of interest, and reasonably informed. 129 As a result, "[i]f a director acts in good faith,
with the requisite degree of care, and within her authority, a court
will not review the action, even if it proves disastrous to the organization."130 Thus, the duty of care encourages attention to decisionmaking processes, but it does nothing to ensure the substantive
quality of the resulting decision. While it may serve to check serious financial abuses such as improper loans or distribution of corporate assets,l3l it has little role in ensuring that the delivery of
social services is held to any measurable quality standard or that
employee abuses do not occur.l 32 Moreover, in the nonprofit context,
courts apply the standard with particular leniency, fearing that too
tough a standard will deter volunteers from serving on nonprofit
boards. 133
The duty of loyalty is designed to ensure that directors serve
the interests of the organization rather than personal or other in-

126. Id. § 8.30. The comment notes that directors of a nonprofit organization have different
goals and resources than directors of a business corporation. Id. § 8.30 cmt. Thus, the drafters
intend that the fiduciary duties imposed on nonprofit directors be applied in a manner that considers the differences between non profits and business corporations as well as the variations
within the nonprofit sector. Id.
127. DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LlABiLlTY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 29 (1988).
128. RMNCA, supra note 124, § 8.30.
129. Id. § 8.30 cmt. The business judgment rule thus supposedly "encourages rational risk
taking and innovation, limits litigation and unfair exposure, encourages service by quality directors, and limits judicial intrusiveness." Goldschmid, supra note 111, at 644. The business judgment rule does not apply to instances involving bad faith, criminal activity, fraud, or willful and
wanton misconduct. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 178.
130. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ; supra note 110, at 155. The authors call the duty of care standard
"quite low," and note that it makes "liability improbable except in the most egregious cases such
as improper loans or distribution of corporate assets." Id. at 179. However, Harvey Goldschmid
argues not that the standards are low, but rather that enforcement efforts are meager. Goldschmid, supra note 111, at 643. Enforcement is discussed infra at notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
131. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 179.
132. In fact, directors are not personally liable for their agents' acts or omissions. GUIDEBOOK
FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 124, at 24-25.
133. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 161. Moreover, many nonprofit board members
are inattentive and play only a figurehead role in management. Id. at 180.

828

VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 54:799

terests. It requires directors to avoid obtaining more favorable financial benefits than they would in an open market or as against
competitors 134 and from usurping corporate opportunities. 135 Nevertheless, directors may engage in self-interested or conflict of interest transactions if the transaction is fair, the conflict is disclosed to
other board members, and the board approves the transaction upon
a "reasonable belief' of its fairness. However, "given the structure
of many charitable boards and the lack of attentiveness of the directors, disinterested directors may be unlikely to challenge the interested director's characterization that the transaction is fair."136 In
addition, directors can reasonably believe that a conflict of interest
transaction is fair without subjecting it to detailed scrutiny and
without choosing instead to approve a superior option. 137 As with
the duty of care, the duty of loyalty focuses on ensuring
accountability to the nonprofits' bottom line. It does little to prevent
poor performance of the nonprofits' goals and mission.
The duty of obedience is a third fiduciary duty, related to the
duty of care, which has occasionally arisen in connection with nonprofits. It requires directors to abide by the purposes and powers of
the charity as expressed in its organizing documents, such as the
articles of incorporation.1 38 Directors cannot act outside of the organization's permissible purposes; that is, they cannot engage in
ultra vires acts. This protects donors from unforeseen uses of contributed donations, and thus, limits how the purposes of the
organization can be modified.1 39 Such a duty would ensure that
directors of a social services nonprofit devoted to homeless ness
could not simply change its mission to serving another population
without notifying the appropriate state officials and amending its
organizational documents. Yet the duty does not address the means
by which the nonprofit delivers services that are within the broad
scope of its defined purposes. Thus, from a programmatic perspective, this doctrine has limit'ed utility in increasing accountability.
In sum, nonprofit corporate management has vast discretion to

134. Id. at 190.
135. Id. at 217.
136. Gary, supra note 111, at 614.
137.Id.
138. Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of Nonprofit Director Liability, 37 DUQ. L.
REV. 557, 562 (1999).
139.Id.
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structure and manage operations without independent oversight,
well above and beyond that allowed in administrative law. 140
3. Enforcement of Nonprofit Director Fiduciary Duties

Regardless of the standards set by nonprofit fiduciary duties,
these duties have only a limited role in policing charitable organizations for abuses because they are rarely enforced. Historically,
state attorneys general have' been responsible for monitoring charitable organizations. 141 In all states, the attorney general has the
authority to bring civil actions "to remove directors and officers for
self-dealing, waste, diversion of a charitable organization's assets,
or other breaches of fiduciary duty."142 However, personnel and
budgetary constraints have limited the effectiveness of the attorneys general, as have informational deficiencies, the lack of public
complaints, and political pressures to focus on more "politically remunerative areas of law enforcement."143 Even if they were well
staffed and funded, the, attorneys general have no power or ability
to exercise day-to-day control over charitable organizations, or to
question their contractual undertakings. 144
Directors are the only group other than the attorneys general with acknowledged standing to challenge fiduciary abuses-yet
they are usually reluctant to sue one another.1 45 In some states,
members of nonprofits have the right to bring a derivative suit to
enforce the purposes of the organization,146 but most nonprofits do
not have members; rather, they have self-perpetuating boards.
140. "There is no general corporate law standard for evaluating whether corporate action is
in the puhlic interest the way that agency action is tested under the arbitrary and capricious
standards." Beerman, supra note 89, at 180. "[T]he level of deference in administrative law does
not approach the level of deference afforded directors' decisions in corporate law." [d. at 181.
141. Mary Grace Blasko et al:, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV.
37, 38 (1993). "State enforcement of charities is based upon the role of the Crown (or, in America,
the state) as parens patriae, imposing an exclusive duty to enforce charitable trusts." [d. at 40.
142. Crimm, supra note 118, at 2 n.3.
143. [d. at 24-25; Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 251.
144. Blasko et aI., supra note 141, at 47; Manne, supra note 143, at 251. Some states allow
relator actions, in which persons can proceed in the name of the attorney general with the attorney general's permission. Blasko et aI., supra note 141, at 49. The relators bear the costs of the
proceeding while the attorney general retains control of the action. [d. Not surprisingly, such
actions are rare. Manne, supra note 143, at 250.
145. Gary, supra note 111, at 625.
146. The RMNCA provides that directors may bring derivative suits. RMNCA, supra note
124, § 6.30: In addition, "any member or members having five percent or more of the voting
power or ... fifty members, whichever is less," may also bring a derivative suit. [d. "Derivative
suits allow a member to protect these interests [in the purposes of the corporation as set forth in
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As for beneficiaries, courts rarely grant them standing to
sue, because of concerns over charities having to fend off expensive
and vexatious litigation. 147 There have been a few exceptions to this
no standing rule in cases where the courts have found beneficiaries
to have "special interests."148 These special interests are most likely
to be found in cases complaining of extraordinary acts, where there
is the presence of fraud or misconduct by directors, and in jurisdictions with minimal attorney general oversight.1 49 Yet a court is
unlikely to find that day-to-day quality-of-service issues amount to
extraordinary acts implicating fraud. Rather, extraordinary acts
generally arise only with violations of a charity's express philanthropic purpose. 150 Moreover, the remedy in such cases is a benefit
to the charity itself, and not monetary damages to the beneficiaries.
Thus, the limited standing rules for charities and the lack of effective state enforcement mean that "the law plays little role, other
than aspirational, in assuring accountability in the nonprofit sector."151
Clearly, the fiduciary standards governing nonprofits, developed in the for-profit realm, are not an effective constraint. In forprofit corporations, directors are judged by their ability to maximize
shareholder profits. There are thus observable yardsticks by which
to evaluate the effectiveness of directors' decisions. Moreover, various forces keep for-profit directors focused on their mission, includits charterJ and to enforce the charity's purpose." Blasko et ai., supra note 141, at 55. For instance, in Cross v. Midtown Club, Inc., the court ruled that members of a nonprofit club had
standing to sue the club over its refusal to admit women, in violation of its charter. 365 A.2d
1227, 1230 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976). However, the right to bring derivative suits may be limited
in case of religious organizations. RMNCA, supra note 124, § 6.30 cmt. 8.
147. Blasko et ai., supra note 141, at 42.
148. Compare Hooker v. Edes Home, 579 A.2d 608, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that residents of free home for elderly indigent widows were members of identifiable beneficiary class
with standing to challenge decision of trustees to close home), with Russell v. Yale Univ., 737
A.2d 941, 946 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that alumni donors and students did not have
standing to contest reorganization of Yale's divinity school).
149. Blasko et ai., supra note 141, at 61-78.
150. See, e.g., Alco Gravure, Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 755-56 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that employees had standing to challenge drastic change in the nature of a foundation whose
original purpose was to aid them); Valley Forge Historical Soc'y v. Wash. Mem'l Chapel, 426 A.2d
1123, 1127-28 (Pa. 1981) (holding that historical society had standing to challenge trustee's attempt to evict them in alleged violation of trust instrument).
151. Goldschmid, supra note 111, at 632; see also Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals:
The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 457, 467 (1996) ("[FJiduciary duty is really a legal obligation without a legal sanction.").
Rob Atkinson points out that the degree to which standing rules to sue charities should expand
hinges on one's theory of the purposes of charities and what one wants them to be. Rob Atkinson,
Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP.
L. 655 (1998).
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ing the threat of shareholder derivative suits, the easy public access
to corporate information under the securities reporting laws,152
global competition, increased activity by institutional investors,
financial press coverage, and hostile takeover attempts. 153 By contrast, in the nonprofit sector, the organization's goals are more
amorphous, and directors are accountable to a broader set of constituencies, including the public, members, donors, customers,
beneficiaries, and other directors. 154 Yet these constituents generally lack the ability or incentive to enforce the fiduciary duties of
directors and officers. Simply put, in the nonprofit realm, there is
"no clear category of principals" and thus the nonprofit firm, as the
agent, has no clear entity to whom it owes accountability.1 55
This is not to say that for-profit entities provide greater accountability to beneficiaries in social service programs. They do not.
For the reasons noted above, in for-profit firms there is adequate
enforcement of fiduciary duties vis-a.-vis profit maximization goals.
However, social service beneficiaries of for-profit firms have no
standing to enforce these fiduciary duties (even if those duties applied for their benefit, which they largely do not), and unlike most
consumers, they cannot pick up and take their money elsewhere.
While corporate management may consider the interests of individuals affected by corporate decisions, "they owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty only to shareholders."156 Moreover, the profitmaximization goal is often inconsistent with the goals of social service programs, where costs are often high while budgets are low.1 57
Thus, the shareholder profit-maximization goal is often inconsistent
with the goals of social service programs, but the former goal must
take precedence under corporate law.
152. Cherry, supra note 138, at 571.
153. Ben-Ner, supra note 124, at 754; Gary, supra note 111, at 595-96; Goldschmid, supra
note 111, at 636; Manne, supra note 143, at 238.
154. Manne, supra note 143, at 227-28. In the nonprofit world, "[t]here is no market for corporate control; there are no proxy battles, no shareholder derivative suits, and there is very little
market competition." Id. at 228.
155. Brody, supra note 151, at 465.
156. Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations that Perform Public Functions: Politics, Profit,
and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 324 (1999). She notes that while several states have enacted corporate constituency statutes that allow corporate decisionmakers to consider nonshareholder interests affected when a takeover is threatened, these statutes do not cover social service
beneficiaries. Id. at 334-35, 350-51. Rather, they are focused on employees, creditors, and other
constituencies. Id.
157. Aman, supra note 90, at 102 ("[T]here will be problems of translation when one balances
the needs of our poorest individuals with the efficiency concerns of a private firm whose primary
task is to determine the eligibility of welfare applicants as efficiently as possible and within the
constraints of a relatively small budget."); see also Wade, supra note 156, at 327-30 (explaining
the incompatibility between maximizing shareholder profits and serving poor populations).
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4. Open Records Requirements Applicable to Nonprofits
Nonprofits have a duty to keep accurate financial records
and share them with the public. Any tax-exempt charity with annual gross receipts normally over $25,000 is required to file an annual financial disclosure form, called a Form 990, with the IRS.15s
Form 990 requests information concerning the organization's exempt activities, its income-producing activities, its payments, gross
income, expenses, disbursements for exempt purposes, assets and
liabilities, net worth, contributions, and compensation paid to certain employees.1 59 State agencies also require various tax reports,
which usually entail attaching a copy of Form 990, and failure to
file these reports is subject to a penalty.160
Yet the use of Form 990 as an accountability tool is limited.
The form asks for financial data and responses to yes or no questions that are targeted at ensuring compliance with the tax-exempt
laws. However, "when trying to measure or evaluate how successful
an organization has been in achieving its substantive program
goals, it is doubtful whether any kind of a report which relies on
text can be useful."16I Moreover, even if Form 990 can alert officials
of financial wrongdoing, neither the state iIor federal enforcement
agencies have the resources to fully analyze these filings to identify
abuses.1 62 At most, Form 990 can be helpful when independent
sources call official attention to alleged abuses.1 63 Thus, the open
records requirements may put an interested person in a position to
spot abuses and, report them to officials, but it is unlikely that social service beneficiaries would have the interest, background, or
ability to analyze the reports to spot abuses in the first place. Beneficiaries would likely be more interested in obtaining quality ser-

158. LR.C. § 6033(a) (1994); Internal Revenue Service, 2001 Instructions for Form 990 and
Form 990·EZ, at http://www.irs.gov.
159. Internal Revenue Service, 2001 Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt from Income
Tax, at http://www.irs.gov. The charity must make its three most recent Form 990s, along with
its tax· exempt application, available to anyone requesting the information. 26 C.F.R. §
301.6104(d)·1 (2001).
160. Peter Swords, The Form 990 as an Accountability Tool for 501(c)(3) Nonprofits, 51 TAX
LAw. 571, 576·78 (1998).
161. Id. at 575. Burton Weisbrod proposes that the form eliminate questions that have
proven to be of little use and focus instead on "outputs" to aid in assessment of nonprofits' effi·
ciency and social contribution. Burton A. Weisbrod, Conclusions and Public-Policy Issues: Commercialism and the Road Ahead, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 93, at 287, 301-02.
162. Swords, supra note 160, at 578-79.
163. Id. at 578.
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vices than in monitoring financial dealings between the organization and its insiders, and federal tax laws give them no standing to
challenge those aspects of an organization's program.
5. Federal Fiduciary Requirements Imposed on Nonprofits
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") also
imposes fiduciary duties on board members, and thus the IRS plays
a role in policing self-dealing in charitable organizations. To qualify
for tax exemption, an organization must be organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, educational, or other
purposes specified in the IRC.164 Under the IRC, a 501(c)(3) organization is absolutely banned from allowing net earnings to inure to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.I 65 Accordingly,
excessive salaries or self-dealing transactions can result in the IRS
revoking an organization's tax-exempt status. This remedy, however, is rarely imposed for fear of penalizing an entire organization
for the misdeeds of a single actor. 166
In 1996, in an effort to modify this extreme penalty, Congress enacted an "intermediate sanction" scheme that imposes an
excise tax penalty on "excess benefit transactions" between the exempt organization and a "disqualified person," or insider. 167 A "disqualified person" is someone in a position to exercise substantial
influence over the affairs of the organization,168 and an excess benefit transaction is one in which the value of the economic benefit conferred exceeds the value of the consideration received. Under this
scheme, the penalty starts at twenty-five percent of the excess
benefit and falls on the insider, rather than the organization. 169
Thus, the intermediate sanctions regime attempts to ensure that
the exempt organization's assets are used for public purposes
rather than for private benefits, but without the harsh penalty of

164. I.R.C. § 501 (1994).
165. Id. § 501(c)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a), (b), (c) (2001). Section 501(c)(3) organizations are also limited in the amount of lobbying they can conduct, and they are barred
from participating in political campaigns. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
166. Gary, supra note Ill, at 630.
167. I.R.C. § 4958(a), (c) (1994).
168. The "substantial influence" category is potentially broad and includes persons without
formal titles within the organization. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 513.
169. Violations that are not remedied result in increased penalties of 200% of the excess
benefit. I.R.C. § 4958(b). Managers who knowingly permit the organization to engage in an excess benefit transaction face lesser penalties. Id. § 4958(a)(2), (d)(2). The penalty is a tax equal to
ten percent of the excess benefit, with the tax capped at $10,000.
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revocation. 170 Again, however, this scheme is aimed at protecting
the charity from unscrupulous insiders and bad deals, but it plays
scant role in policing the substantive work of the charity.
6. Tort Immunities of Nonprofits and Their Agents
Part of organizational accountability derives from an entity's
exposure to liability for the negligence or wrongdoing of its agents.
Thus, tort liability plays a role in deterring firms from taking actions that create costlier risks than benefits.1 71 However, because
nonprofits generally receive preferential treatment in the area of
tort liability, they may be underdeterred from engaging in risky
behavior. This could affect social service beneficiaries in several
ways. Beneficiaries are relying on nonprofits to provide them with
services ranging from job training to addiction counseling to life
skills trainingJ72 Given the intense interpersonal aspects of these
services, beneficiaries could be subject not only to garden variety
personal injuries sustained from unsafe premises, but also to torts
such as negligent counseling, infliction of emotional distress, and
defamation.
Courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
awarded charities full immunity from tort liability for the acts of
their members, directors, or employees.1 73 However, by the 1940s,
courts were quickly eroding the charitable immunity doctrine in
order to broaden tort recovery to compensate victims for harm.174 By

170. As a result, revocation is likely only in the extreme circumstance in which the organization can no longer be considered charitable. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note no, at 513.
171. See Charles Robert Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 425 (1991). Tort law serves other purposes as well. "Tort liability rules
seek to deter injurious behavior, compensate victims, and spread an activity's losses among the
beneficiaries of that activity. In addition, the tort system manifests societal judgments about the
value of various types of activity, the acceptability of causing injury, and the nature of obligations to assist those who suffer harm, thereby manifesting fundamental principles of justice." Id.
at 422-23.
172. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
173. There were four main rationales for this charitable immunity. Courts reasoned that (1)
applying charitable trust assets to damage awards would divert them from the donor's purposes;
(2) respondeat superior should not apply because charities did not profit from their employees'
work; (3) charitable beneficiaries assumed the risk of harm because they did not pay consideration for services received; and (4) imposing liability on charities could result in their bankruptcy
and a loss of donors and volunteers. Paul T. O'Neill, Charitable Immunity: The Time to End
Laissez-Faire Health Care in Massachusetts Has Come, 82 MAss. L. REV. 223, 227-30 (1997).
174. Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations: Special Treatment and Tort Law,
lO5 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1680 (1992) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. The wall began to
crumble with the decision in President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, in which the court re-
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the 1980s, the doctrine was either fully or partially abolished in
almost every state, either by case law or by statute.1 75 Yet the pendulum soon began to swing back towards providing some protection
for charities, because of a series of large monetary judgments
awarded against some charities,176 the lack of available insurance
liability coverage,177 and the increase in personal liability for those
working in the nonprofit sector.1 78
The resulting protections vary widely from state to state. To
protect organizations, several states provide partial immunity or
limited liability for charitable organizations through statutory
damage caps, caps on recovery to insurance coverage limits, or
complete protection of certain assets. A few states have even retained some form of common law charitable immunity for organizations. To protect individuals, most states have enacted legislation
that protects a variety of charitable actors, such as volunteers and
unpaid directors, and even employees.1 79 In general, these statutes
protect charitable actors from personal liability for negligent acts,
but do not immunize them for liability for actions which are "willful
and wanton," ultra vires, or taken in bad faith.1 80 In light of the
lack of state uniformity, Congress passed the Federal Volunteer
Protection Act of 1997 ("FVPA").1 81 This Act protects charitable vol-

jected the charitable immunity of a hospital sued for negligence of a hospital employee. 130 F.2d
810, 823-25 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
175. Developments in the Law, supra note 174, at 1680.
176. See, e.g., Daniel L. Kurtz, Protecting Your Volunteer: The Efficacy of Volunteer Protection Statutes and Other Liability Limiting Devices, in NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: THE
CHALLENGE OF GOVERNANCE IN AN ERA OF RETRENCHMENT 263, 269 (ALI-ABA Course of Study,
1992), WL C726 ALI-ABA 263 (citing Thomas Heath, $45,000 Award to Molested Va. Youth
Hailed as Victory by Scouts, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1989, at D1; Lisa Green Markoff, A Volunteer's
Thankless Task, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 19, 1988, at 1; Gary Taylor, Goodwill Must Pay $5M in Murder
by Parolee-Employee, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1987, at 22.)
177. David O. Weber, A Thousand Points of Fright?, INS. REV., Feb. 1991, at 40, 40 (stating
that between 1984 and 1989 "the cost of liability coverage for local [little league] programs shot
up from $75 to $795 a year").
178. Developments in the Law, supra note 174, at 1680-82.
179. For statutes that cover employees, see, for example, D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-301.114(b)
(2001) (placing a statutory limit on employees' personal liability arising from acts or omissions in
providing services or performing duties on behalf of a nonprofit corporation); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:53A-7 (West 1999); and TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 84.002(7) (Vernon 1997) (establishing that charitable immunity extends to employees).
180. Kurtz, supra note 176, at 270-71. However, these laws are complex, confusing, and there
is a paucity of cases interpreting them. As a result, this patchwork of protections "creates grave
uncertainty for insurance underwriters, ... and, therefore, vitiat[es] the certainty of reduced
liability that leads to reduced rates and wider availability of D&O insurance." Id. at 289. For a
discussion of the various state laws, see id. at 279-89.
181. Kenneth W. Biedzynski, The Federal Volunteer Protection Act: Does Congress Want to
Play Ball?, 23 SETON HALL LEGlS. J. 319, 335 (1999) (discussing legislative history of the Act).
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unteers from liability "for harm caused by an act or omission of the
volunteer on behalf of the organization or entity."182
The various immunities that result from state and federal
law encourage volunteerism, a worthy goal, but put the costs of negligent conduct on the victims of negligent behavior. Because charitable organizations do not have to internalize certain accident costs,
they have less incentive than for-profit entities to prevent or monitor negligent behavior.l 83 Some might argue that having victims
carry the costs of negligence is balanced by the fact that the charitable entity then has more resources available to assist other beneficiaries. Yet the justifications for protecting charities are arguably
lessened in the government-contracting arena where charities are
acting in a quasi-commercial capacity and competing in an open
market with governmental and for-profit entities. From the victims'
perspective, they have little or no choice as to what type of entity
delivers the needed services. While it is outside the scope of this
Article to address what the tort liability rules should be in this context-from full tort liability to full immunity to something in between 184-it is important to note that tort law does treat nonprofits
differently. This difference affects accountability and suggests that
preventative measures need to be implemented to counterbalance
the preferential treatment afforded to nonprofits.

C. Religious Organizations and Accountability
There are over 300,000 religious congregations in the United
States,185 almost all of which are organized as nonprofit corpora-

182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14503-14505 (Supp. IV 1998). Volunteers are entitled to protection if the
following conditions are met: (1) "the volunteer was acting within the scope" of their responsibilities; (2) "the volunteer was properly licensed ... by the appropriate authorities for the activities"
in the state where the harm occurred; (3) the injury "was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct"; and (4) the volunteer was not operating a motor vehicle or vehicle required by State
law to carry insurance. [d. § 14503. The Act does not protect volunteers from liability for various
crimes, including hate crimes, civil rights violations, and crimes of violence. [d. § 14503(a)(3), (f).
Although the FVPA preempts inconsistent state law, it allows states to provide additional protection from liability for volunteers, and also permits states to opt out of the scheme altogether.
[d. § 14502.
183. Tremper, supra note 171, at 403-04 ("Although the approach serves the goals of reducing payments, increasing certainty, and encouraging settlements, the resultant denial of recovery to negligently injured individuals cannot be justified on any principled basis.").
184. See id. at 444-66. He advocates a system in which tort recovery would become a backup
for individuals who would not receive compensation from first-party insurance or a proposed
governmental assistance program.
185. Jeff E. Biddle, Religious Organizations, in WHO BENEFITS FROM THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR? 92, 92 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992). There are more than one thousand religious
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tions. 186 Together, they collect and spend more than fifty billion dollars each year. 187 Religious organizations have a long history of providing social services in this country, often working side by side
with government. "Typically, religiously motivated persons have
been the first into areas of societal need. Secular agencies and government have followed."188 As a subset of nonprofits, religious organizations generally share the same fiduciary obligations and immunities as other charitable organizations. However, lawmakers
have long been wary of regulating religious organizations for fear of
running afoul of the First Amendment's proscription on excessive
entanglement with religion. 189 As a result, religious organizations
have freedoms from regulation and, liability above and beyond that
of other charitable organizations. This section discusses the accountability doctrines that govern religious organizations.
1. Fiduciary Duties Applicable to Religious Organizations

The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act ("RMNCA")
recognizes three types of nonprofit organizations: public benefit
(corporations formed for charitable or public purposes), mutual
benefit (member-oriented corporations such as social clubs and
trade associations), and religious (operating primarily or exclu-

denominations in the United States. See 1 WILLIAM W. BASSE'IT, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE LAw, at xi (1999).

186. Eighty·seven percent of religious organizations organize in the nonprofit corporate form.
Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV.
439, 441·42. Most churches incorporate for advantages of limited liability, organizational conti·
nuity, and administrative convenience. Id. at 444; Catherine M. Knight, Comment, Must God
Regulate Religious Corporations? A Proposal for Reform of the Religious Corporation Provisions
of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 42 EMORY L.J. 721, 724 (1993). However, the
business model of members and a board of directors does not necessarily fit the structural form of
religious denominations. 1 BASSE'IT, supra note 185, § 1:1; Knight, supra, at 725-27 (describing
different denominational forms of church governance). Other organizational forms a church
might choose include an unincorporated association, a trust or foundation, a religious corporation, a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation, or a nonprofit charitable organization. 1 BASSE'IT,
supra note 185, § 3:7.
187. Biddle, supra note 185, at 92, 93. They receive the largest share of Americans' annual
donations of money and volunteer labor. Ben-Ner, supra note 124, at 742-43.
188. MONSMA, supra note 46, at 8.
189. GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, supra note 124, at 14 ("The
directors of religious corporations are generally subject to the foregoing considerations [concerning accountability]. However, because American constitutional law generally restricts the role of
government in dealing with religious corporations to a minimum enforcement of basic fiscal
integrity, oversight is more limited, lest the government intrude on freedom of religion.");
HOPKINS, supra note 108, § 8.1.
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sively for religious purposes).190 Although directors and officers of
religious organizations share the same fiduciary duties as their
counterparts in other nonprofit corporations, the RMNCA provides
religious organizations with greater flexibility in structure and operation. 191 The comment explains, "By applying fewer rules to religious corporations, ... and limiting the attorney general's jurisdiction, the Revised Act recognizes the need to avoid unconstitutional
intrusions into the activities of religious corporations."192 Thus, for
instance, religious organizations can remove members and directors
with greater ease than can other nonprofits. 193 Also, with regard to
open records, religious organizations need not provide members
with rights to inspect membership lists or receive financial statements. 194
Given this framework, it is not surprising that external
oversight of religious nonprofits is less rigorous than the already
minimal oversight of other nonprofits. For instance, under the
RMNCA, provisions allowing courts to appoint receivers and custodians to dissolve nonprofits do not apply to religious organizations,
nor do requirements that dissolving nonprofits report the names
and addresses of individuals receiving assets to the attorney general. The RMNCA also provides that, unlike other nonprofits, religious organizations need not notify the attorney general of any derivative suits-and it cautions that constitutional provisions may in
fact prevent courts from considering derivative suits brought on
behalf of religious organizations in the first place. In sum, religious
organizations have greater flexibility in structuring their form than
do other nonprofits and less oversight from external bodies. 195 Much

190. RMNCA, supra note 124, at xxii· xxix. AB of 1999, the RMNCA had been adopted by
eight states, although many other states have assumed sections of the Act into their own non·
profit corporations statutes. 1 BASSETI', supra note 185, § 3:7 & n.4.
191. RMNCA, supra note 124, at xxx.
192. [d. The same corporate flexibility for churches is usually found even in those states not
using the RMNCA. Gerstenblith, supra note 186, at 447·60. It is not clear, however, that the
Constitution actually mandates such preferential treatment. Knight, supra note 186, at 742·45.
193. Under the RMNCA, requirements imposing fair procedures for terminating members
are not applicable to religious organizations, and religious groups can opt out of provisions relat·
ing to the removal of directors, including provisions allowing for court removal of directors under
certain circumstances. RMNCA, supra note 124, §§ 8.08, 8.10. In addition, religious organiza·
tions can define the procedures for how members call special meetings, whereas other nonprofits
must caIl a special meeting upon the written demand of at least five percent of the voting power
of any corporation. [d. § 7.02(a)(2).
194. [d. § 7.20(f).
195. In addition, religious organizations have various privileges at common law and by statute, for instance: (1) religion enjoys the favor of tbe law in interpreting wills and trusts containing bequests of private money property to charity; (2) clergy are exempt from conscription and
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of this flexibility works to the advantage of the organization as opposed to its constituents. For members, who have the freedom to
move to a new congregation, the organizational protections for
churches may be harmless. But for social service beneficiaries,
these protections further hinder accountability.
2. Federal Oversight of Nonprofit Religious Organizations

The IRC exempts from taxation corporations "organized and
operated exclusively for religious . . . purposes."196 Corporations
within this category include churches I97 and "conventions or associations of churches,"198 "integrated auxiliaries of churches,"199 and
the "exclusively religious activities" of religious orders.20o As with
other 501(c)(3) charitable organizations, contributions to churches
are deductible from federal income taxes. 20l Yet churches and their
integrated auxiliaries need not file an application for determination
of tax-exempt status from the IRS to claim their exemption or to
accept deductible donations. 202 Rather, they are presumed to be ex-

their work is exempt from government regulation such as the National Labor Relations Act; (3)
"canvassing and door· to-door solicitation of contributions for religious societies cannot be subjected to state discretionary licensing requirements, but ... [can] only be regulated as to time,
manner, and place"; and (4) "conscience clauses to provide ethical accommodations are inserted
into state and federal funding programs," and religious exceptions are carved out of civil rights
legislation. See 1 BASSETI', supra noto 185, § 1:10.
196. l.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3) (1994).
197. The Internal Revenue Code does not define the terms "religion" or "church." As the Supreme Court has stated, "[T]he great diversity in church structure and organization among religious groups in this country ... makes it impossible, as Congress perceived, to lay down a single
rule to govern all church-related organizations." St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 782 n.12 (1981). However, the IRS looks at fourteen criteria, none of
which are controlling, to determine whether an entity qualifies as a church: (1) a distinct legal
existence; (2) a recognized creed and form of worship; (3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical
government; (4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline; (5) a distinct religious history; (6) a
membership not associated with any other church or denomination; (7) an organization of ordained ministers; (8) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies; (9) a literature of its own; (10) established places of worship; (11) religious congregations; (12) regular worship services; (13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young; and (14) schools for the
preparation of ministers. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL § 321.3; Rev. Rul. 59-129,1959-1 C.B. 58.
198. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
199. Id. Integrated auxiliaries include schools, missions societies, or youth groups that are
afflliated with a church, internally supported, and meet one of the tests for avoiding private
foundation status. 26 C.F.R. § 6033-2(h)(I) (2001).
200. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(2)(A)(iii).
201. Id. § 170(b)(I)(A)(i), (c)(2)(B).
202. Id. § 508(a), (c)(I)(A). Nevertheless, religious groups often seek formal determinations of
their tax-exempt status to assure donors and grantors of the deductibility of contributions. See
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 110, at 446.
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empt. Moreover, churches need not file the annual financial information return, called the Form 990, required of secular nonprofits,203 and they have various immunities and protections from IRS
audits. 204 Thus, under federal law, religious organizations receive
preferential treatment not available to other nonprofits. 205 The lack
of openness in financial records is particularly troublesome in the
context of contracting out, as it eliminates one of the very few ways
in which independent members of the public can get some sort of
snapshot of what the organization is doing. 206
3. Limitations on Tort Liability of Religious Organizations and
Their Agents

While the tort liability of nonprofits and their agents is more
limited than that of for-profit entities, the tort liability of religious
organizations is even further complicated by First Amendment considerations. 207 The Supreme Court has long held that the First
Amendment bars courts from adjudicating religious questions. 208 As

203. I.R.C. §§ 508(c)(I)(A), 6033(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii). Churches must file a financial return if they
generate unrelated husiness income tax ("UBIT"). UBIT is profits derived from commercial ac·
tivities unrelated to the religious purpose of the organization. Id. § 511.
204. The IRS can only audit churches and affiliated organizations if the Regional Commis·
sioner has independent information from a third party that the church may not qualify for tax
exemption as a church, may be carrying on an unrelated trade or business, or otherwise be en·
gaged in taxable activities. Id. § 7611(a)(I)(A), (a)(2). Prior to starting an investigation, the IRS
must provide written notice to the church aclvising the church of its rights. Id. § 7611(a)(1)(B),
(a)(3). The IRS must also provide advance notice of its intent to examine church records. Id. §
7611(b)(1), (b)(2)(A). The IRS may examine records only to the extent necessary to determine the
tax amount. Id. § 7611(b)(I)(A). For a full description of the IRS audit procedures for churches,
see HOPKINS, supra note 108, § 24.8(b), at 611·19.
205. A summary of the tax rules affecting churches can be found in Richard R. Hammar,
Federal Income Tax Issues, in RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS AS NONPROFIT ENTITIES: ISSUES OF
ACCESS, SPECIAL STATUS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, The Nat'l Ctr. on Philan·
thropy & the Law ed., 1983).
206. For other federal statutory privileges afforded to religious organizations, see 1 BASSETT,
supra note 185, § 1:11, at 1·42 to 1·46.
207. As one scholar has noted, "[T]ort law and freedom of religion are in a significant way
diametrically opposed. The former represents the enforcement of communitarian intolerance of
antisocial acts; the latter represents the protection of unpopular, even antisocial, views and
practices from the majority's tendency to want to squelch them." Paul T. Hayden, Religiously
Motivated "Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon
Against "Other People's Faiths," 34 WM. & MARy L. REV. 579, 597·98 (1993).
208. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709·15 (1976) (holding that
civil courts may not review ecclesiastical decisions); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280
U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (same); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1871) (mem.) (concluding
that courts must defer to judgment of highest religious authority in determining intrachurch
property dispute); cf. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602·06 (1979) (concluding that courts may
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a result, courts cannot inquire into the validity of religious beliefs,
they cannot independently interpret religious texts, and they can~
not examine the internal decisionmaking of religious entities. 209
Tort claims that implicate these proscriptions are usually dismissed. For instance, lawsuits challenging the standard of care of a
church's or cleric's conduct run into the courts' reluctance to devise
an "objective" standard of care for religious leaders (the "reasonable
bishop," the "reasonable rabbi," and so forth).210 Thus, claims of
"clergy malpractice," such as claims that churches are responsible
for the sexual misconduct of their clergy, have never succeeded. 211
Clearly, this reluctance to interfere with the management of religious groups raises issues in the charitable choice context because
clergy may play an integral role in providing the contracted-for services to extremely vulnerable populations.
This reluctance to "embroil courts in establishing the training, skill, and standards applicable for members of the clergy in a
diversity of religions"212 has also resulted in many courts rejecting
other tort claims, including those for breach of fiduciary duty; negligent hiring and supervision; tortious interference with contract;
negligent infliction of emotional distress; intentional infliction of
emotional distress; and defamation. 213 Similarly, even above and
beyond the statutory exemptions afforded to religious organizations
from various antidiscrimination laws,214 some courts have created
common law exceptions that permit religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, age, or disability in their employment decisions. 215 In addition, while every state regulates the
practice of psychology and counseling, pastoral counseling within a
church to members of the congregation does not fall within these
adjudicate intrachurch disputes where they can be resolved on the basis of neutral principles of
law).
209. See Scott C. Idleman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and the Decline of Constitutional
Protection, 75 IND. L.J. 219, 221-23 (2000). The courts vary on whether they ground these principles in the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, or the First Amendment in general.
[d. at 223-25.
210. See id. at 231-34.
211. See id.
212. F.G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697,703 (N.J. 1997).
213. See Idleman, supra note 209, at 234-37 nn.43-53. Idleman notes that while the courts
"are far from uniform in their refusal to adjudicate tort actions against religious entities," the
majority trend appears to be one of nonadjudicability. [d. at 239.
214. For example, under Title VII, religious organizations can fire or refuse to hire employees
for religious reasons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (1994). The charitable choice legislation expressly preserves this exemption. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(f), 100 Stat. 2105, 2163 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (Supp. III 1997».
215. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1079 (1996).

842

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:799

regulations. 216 It is not clear whether counseling by clergy as part of
a social services program will fall within this exception, although
given the secular purposes underlying social welfare programs, pastoral counselors should be required to follow the same licensing and
certification requirements as their secular counterparts.
Under charitable choice, religious groups are expressly prohibited from using federal funds to engage in proselytizing or worship with beneficiaries. 217 As a result, it may be difficult for them to
hide behind the religious nature of their activities in any tort suit
arising out of social service provision under charitable choice. A series of counseling cases in which plaintiffs sued clergy for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress demonstrates this distinction. In Destefano v. Grabrian, a husband and wife sued their
Catholic priest and local diocese after the priest had an affair with
the wife while he was conducting marriage counseling for the couple. 218 The defendants raised the First Amendment as a barrier,
arguing that "the performance of pastoral duties by a Catholic
priest, including sacramental counseling of parishioners, is a matter of ecclesiastical cognizance and policy with which a civil court
cannot interfere."219 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this defense, stating that the defendants had acknowledged that the
priest's conduct did not fall within the practices or beliefs of the
Catholic Church. 220 The court noted, however, that it might have a
different question had the conduct been taken in accord with the
priest's religious practices. 221
Under this line of reasoning, the key question is whether the
defendant's conduct is religiously motivated. An admission of religious motivation might well put a charitable choice defendant in
the position of admitting that he or she has overstepped the statute's boundaries. Nevertheless, an argument might be made that
any alleged tortious counseling was motivated and shaped by religious beliefs, even if it does not implicate proselytizing or worship.222 This would present a more difficult question, but a foresee-

216. See RICHARD R. HAMMAR, PASTOR, CHURCH & LAw § 4-10 (3d ed. 2000).
217. § 104(j), no Stat. at 2162.
218. 763 P.2d 275, 278 (Colo. 1988).
219. Id. at 283.
220. Id. at 284 (stating that defendants "recognize[ 1 and admit[ 1 that sexual activity by a
priest is fundamentally antithetical to Catholic doctrine").
221. Id.
222. There remain complicated questions of whether liability for tortious conduct ascends
from the individual who committed the act to the organization itself and even to coordinate and
superior levels of the ecclesiastical entity. See generally Mark E. Chopko, Ascending Liability of
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able one given that charitable choice aims to preserve the religious
nature of grantees while protecting beneficiaries from indoctrination. 223 The legislation envisions that religious doctrine will motivate the service strategy undertaken by charitable choice grantees.
In turn, this is likely to create complicated questions that delve into
the interconnection between religious beliefs and service strategies,
an area the courts have thus far indicated they prefer to avoid.

D. Limits on Obtaining Accountability Through Contract Law
Charitable choice is part of a larger societal movement towards privatization, or contracting out, of governmental functions. 224 A decision to outsource a government social service program generally results in a contract between the government and
the private provider. Thus, contracts could provide a key vehicle for
enforcing accountability.225 Contract law is especially appealing for
ensuring accountability in the charitable choice context, because
unlike tort law and the statutes discussed previously, churches do
not have any special immunities or other protections from contract
claims. Rather, they are deemed to operate in the commercial world
as any other entity. Yet legal doctrine as well as the procurement
process fails to provide social service beneficiaries with adequate
protections. First, contract law provides scant enforcement rights to
third-party beneficiaries. Second, procurement processes at the
state and local levels rarely involve beneficiaries. Third, as a practical matter, it is very difficult to monitor and measure contract
performance in the realm of social services. Each of these current
barriers to achieving accountability through contract is addressed
in turn.

Religious Entities for the Actions of Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 289 (1993) (examining the
potential bases of liability of religious organizations for the actions of its members, employees, or
agents). Religious organizations may be able to avoid certain risks by separately incorporating
different layers of hierarchy or separable functions. See Jill S. Manny, Governance Issues for
Non·Profit Religious Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1, 1-2 (2000).
223. Whether these goals are compatible is questionable. See Rogers, supra note 5, at 62
("While one can separate tile sacred from the secular in a religiously affiliated organization,
there is no good way to do so in a church or similar entity. It is like trying to take vanilla flavor·
ing out of a cake.").
224. See supra notes 56·65 and accompanying text.
225. See generally Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV .. 155 (2000)
(discussing the accountability challenges raised by contracting out and how contract law could be
used to enforce fairness norms embodied in administrative law).
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1. Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine

Contract law has the potential to promote accountability in
an outsourcing regime, because it holds contractors to terms to
which they have assented. For instance, participants in a drug
treatment program run by a church under contract with a local
municipality may want to challenge the quality of services rendered
by the church. Perhaps an untrained volunteer conducts the counseling, or the methods are unduly coercive. If the contract sets forth
performance specifications and objectives, the participants may be
able to argue that they are third-party beneficiaries of the contract
with the right to enforce its terms.
In general, third parties can enforce contracts that are "intended" to benefit them. 226 The "intent to benefit" standard is a malleable one, and it is difficult to say with certainty whether any particular category of beneficiaries fall within it. Clearly, if the contract grants express rights of enforcement to third parties, the
courts will honor the intent of the contracting parties. Likewise,
where the contract expressly denies enforcement to third parties,
that intent will also be upheld. 227 Yet for contracts that do not address the enforcement status of third parties, the law is murkier.
Especially where government contracts are concerned, courts
are hesitant to grant enforcement rights to the public at large, fearing a limitless class of plaintiffs.228 Thus, for instance, where a pri-

226. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, only those third parties who are "intended" beneficiaries have rights under the contract. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
302 (1981). To qualify as an intended beneficiary, the third party must first show that "recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the
parties." Id. § 302(1). In addition, the party must show that (a) "the performance of the promise
will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary" or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance." Id. For a history of the development of the third party beneficiary doctrine, see
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1360-74 (1992), and
Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).
227. See, e.g., Cobos v. Dona Ana County Hous. Auth., 908 P.2d 250, 225 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995) ("[T]he intent of the clause is clear, and our duty is to enforce the contract as written."),
rev'd on other grounds, 970 P.2d 1143 (N.M. 1998).
228. See Eisenberg, supra note 226, at 1407. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts addresses third-party beneficiary law in the context of government contracts. It provides that:
(2) a promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do
an act for or render a service to the public is not subject to contractual liability
to a member of the public for consequential damages resulting from performance or failure to perform unless (a) the terms of the promise provide for such
liability; or (b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the public
for the damages and a direct action against the promisor is consistent with the
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vate water utility failed to supply water to a hydrant, and a private
property owner's building was subsequently destroyed by fire, the
court concluded that the property owner was a mere incidental,
rather than intended, beneficiary.229 Judge Cardozo stated that "[a]
promisor will not be deemed to have had in mind the assumption of
a risk so overwhelming for any trivial reward."230
By contrast, where the beneficiaries constitute a more discrete and identifiable class, they have greater success in enforcing
public contracts. For example, in Fuzie u. Manor Care, Inc., a nursing home resident was deemed, under the Medicaid rules, a thirdparty beneficiary of a contract between the nursing home and the
State of Ohio.231 The plaintiff alleged that the nursing home intended to transfer or discharge her for nonmedical reasons, in violation of the Medicaid regulations. 232 The Court concluded that the
contract incorporated federal regulations and that the plaintiff was
a member of the class intended to be benefited by the statutory
scheme. 233 Cases such as Fuzie are "an excellent example of the way
in which plaintiffs can use the third party beneficiary rule to secure
the private benefits of a public program."234
Yet, at bottom, there are two profound limits on the usefulness of third-party beneficiary theory to protect the rights of social
service beneficiaries. First, the contracting parties can expressly
terms of the contract and with the policy of the law authorizing the contract
and prescribing remedies for its breach.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313 (1981).
In accord with the Restatement, some courts look not only at intent to benefit, but also for an
intent to grant standing to enforce the benefit. See Robert S. Adelson, Note, Third Party Benefi·
ciary and Implied Right of Action Analysis: The Fiction of One Governmental Intent, 94 YALE L.J.
875, 879 (1985). Other courts reject the latter requirement. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d
1261, 1270 n.17 (7th Cir. 1981). Adelson makes the point that intent should be divined not only
from the underlying statute, but also from the intent of the agency entering into the contract.
Adelson, supra, at 891·92.
229. H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897 (N.Y. 1928).
230. Id. at 897-98. This seminal case is used as an illustration to section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
231. 461 F. Supp. 689, 697-98 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
232. Id. at 692.
233. Id. at 697-98.
234. Waters, supra note 226, at 1187. The third-party beneficiary theory has also had some
success in the context of public housing programs, which generally involve a contract between
the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (UHUD") and either a local government or private landlord. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261,1269-76 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that section 8 tenants were third-party beneficiaries of contracts executed between HUD and
private landlords); Hurt v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 806 F. Supp. 515, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (same);
Henry Horner Mothers Guild v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 780 F. Supp. 511, 515-16 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(same); Ayala v. Boston Hous. Auth., 536 N.E.2d 1082, 1088-90 (Mass. 1989) (holding that tenants were third-party beneficiaries and could recover damages flowing from housing authority's
breach of obligations under contract to inspect for lead paint hazards).
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disclaim any third-party enforcement rights and thereby eliminate
this method of enforcement. Governments have some inherent interest in allowing for third-party enforcement of contracts because
it provides a "free" method of monitoring contract performance. Yet
at the same time, both the government and the private contractors
have strong financial incentives to limit the scope of their liability.
Given that the program beneficiaries are not at the negotiating table, they have no input into how these competing incentives play
out. This raises the second shortcoming of the third-party beneficiary theory. Without a role in contract negotiations, beneficiaries
have no say in the terms of the contract and thus may be left with
boilerplate contracts that provide them with no meaningful contract
rights even to consider enforcing. In addition, local governments
have little experience in performance contracting and rarely draft
contracts with detailed specifications and objectives that would ensure accountability from private contractors.235 Without meaningful, substantive terms to enforce, being a third-party beneficiary is
a hollow victory indeed.
2. The Procurement Process and the Absence of Beneficiaries

As noted above, program beneficiaries have little voice in the
government procurement process. The contracting process is
lengthy, highly regulated, and includes the following phases: assessing needs; soliciting bids through a request for proposals;
evaluating bids; negotiating with bidders; awarding, drafting, and
signing a contract; and monitoring the contract. 236 This process does
not include program beneficiaries and rarely provides for public input. 237 Rather, the procurement regime focuses on the rights of bidders and is aimed at ensuring a competitive, efficient, and ethical

235. See infra notes 253·59 and accompanying text.
236. See JOHN A. O'LOONEY, OUTSOURCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES:
DECISION·MAKING STRATEGIES AND MANAGEMENT METHODS 14 (1998).
237. Although the Model Procurement Code for Local and State Governments provides that
procurement information shall he subject to a state's freedom of information act or similar open
records law, MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS § 1·401 (2000)
[hereinafter MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE], it also provides that certain types of information
solicited in the bidding process shall remain confidential. See, e.g., id. § 3-401. Similarly, although the government must provide public notice of solicitations for bids and proposals, id .. §§
3-202(3), 3- 203(3), the purpose of these requirements is "to permit potential bidders to prepare
and submit their bids in a timely manner," id. § 3-202(3) cmt., and not for public input into the
terms of the solicitation or who should be awarded the solicitation.
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selection process. 238 For example, the 2000 Model Procurement Code
for State and Local Governments provides that bid awards can be
administratively challenged by "any actual or prospective bidder,
offeror, or contractor who is aggrieved," but makes no provision for
aggrieved program beneficiaries. 239 Procurement law, which grew
out of the fairly straightforward procurement of goods, is simply not
a satisfactory model for the procurement of human services. In the
human services arena, more stakeholders exist, and the stakes for
these constituents are higher-often involving basic human necessities such as shelter, clothing, food, and medical care.
3. Challenges to Defining, Monitoring, and Measuring Performance
The final challenge to using contracts to improve accountability is the complex nature of social service delivery. In the social
services field, interactions between providers and beneficiaries are
intensely interpersonal. For instance, in the area of welfare, government workers previously needed only to assess objective eligibility criteria and then issue checks. However, welfare providers are
now charged with putting people to work, and thus they engage in a
variety of counseling tasks. 240 These client assessments, "because

238. See id. § 1-101 (stating that the purposes of the Code are, inter alia, "to ensure the fair
and equitable treatment of all persons who deal with the procurement system of this [state] ... ;
to foster effective broad-based competition within the free enterprise system ... ; and to provide
safeguards for the maintenance of a procurement system of quality and integrity"); Joseph A.
Cosentino, Jr., New York City's Procurement System: Reversing the Cycle of Corruption and Reactionary Reform, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1998) (stating that the goals of government
contracting are "efficiency, prevention of corruption, and fairness to the providers of goods and
services").
239. MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 237, § 9-101(1). The commentary provides that
state law governs the availability of taxpayer suits. Taxpayer suits can provide a basis for citizens to challenge wrongful acts committed by local governments in the contracting process. See
Lewis J. Baker, Procurement Disputes at the State and Local Level: A Hodgepodge of Remedies,
25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 265, 291-93 (1996). However, taxpayers generally lack standing where the
government has wide discretion in awarding contracts. Id. at 292. Moreover, some jurisdictions
require proof of actual pecuniary loss to the taxpayer through increased taxation before finding
taxpayer standing. Id. Because taxpayer suits are aimed at challenging the award of a contract
to a particular bidder, such suits are of limited utility to social service beneficiaries challenging
the quality of services received. For a discussion of third-party standing to challenge government
contracts at the federal level, see Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The
Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52
ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 905-08 (2000).
240. These include educating applicants about the TANF program; assessing their work histories and attempts to obtain employment; reviewing their eligibility for entitlement benefits
such as SSI, Medicaid, and Food Stamps; determining their eligibility for cash grants, loans, or
other services to divert them from the TANF program; assisting them in securing child support
from noncustodial parents; helping them with job searches; assessing their child care and trans-
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they involve direct contact with clients, . . . are at least partially
unpredictable, largely unobservable and difficult to evaluate."241 In
a contracting scheme based on such complex interactions, it is hard
to define the tasks involved in advance and it is equally difficult to
measure performance afterwards. Yet definition and measurement
are exactly what are needed to obtain quality services.
Recognizing this, management professionals are urging governments to use performance contracting when privatizing social
services. 242 Previously, social service contracts emphasized inputs;
that is, governments evaluated performance by the procedures
used, wages to be paid, or the amount or type of equipment or time
and labor used. 243 By contrast, performance-based contracting focuses on results. 244 For instance, in the welfare context, perform-

portation needs, as well as 'domestic violence problems or alcohol or drug abuse; drafting individualized plans to attain economic self-sufficiency; and assisting them in locating job training,
GED, ESOL, and other skill building activities. RICHARD P. NATHAN & THOMAS L. GAlS,
IMPLEMENTING THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996: A FIRST LOOK 21 (1999).
241. Marcia K. Meyers, Gaining Cooperation at the Front Lines of Service Delivery: Issues for
the Implementation of Welfare Reform, ROCKEFELLER REP. (Nelson A. Rockefeller Inst. of Gov't),
June 12, 1998, at 4, at http://www.rockinst.org/publications/rockefellerjeports/rr07.htmI.
242. ELISA VINSON, GOVERNING-FOR-RESULTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: PERFORMANCE
CONTRACTING IN SIX STATE HUMAN SERVICES AGENCIES 1 (1999) ("Performance contracting, long
used in such government services as highway maintenance and solid waste management, is
becoming increasingly attractive to state human services agencies. Often frustrated by declining
performance, rising costs, or both, they want to pay for results, not activities.").
There is a similar movement afoot to improve federal and state government accountability
through performance management. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, PERFORMANCE
BASED PROCUREMENT: ANOTHER MODEL FOR CALIFORNIA 1 (1998) (describing how the California
Franchise Tax Board adopted an alternative procurement approach for technology expenditures);
BARBARA DYER, THE OREGON OPTION: EARLY LESSONS FROM A PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP ON
BUILDING RESULTS-DRIVEN ACCOUNTABILITY (1996) (describing a results-driven partnership
between multiple levels of government and multiple entities within each level of government),
available at http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/progsys/oregonllessons.htm; BLAINE LINER & ELISA VINSON,
GOVERNING-FOR-RESULTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY: WILL STATES MEET THE CHALLENGE? 1 (1999)
("A major effort has been under way since 1993 to initiate reporting on the results of all major
federal programs in response to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.");
OUTCOME MEASUREMENT IN THE HUMAN SERVICES (Edward J. Mullen & Jenifer L. Magnabosco
eds., 1997) (collecting essays); JESSICA YATES, PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN HUMAN SERVICES
(1997) (describing different state initiatives in performance management in human services).
243. See Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 21.
244. Outcome measurement is one aspect of overall performance measurement under which
a provider measures "the benefits or results it has for its customers, clients, or participants."
Margaret C. Plantz et aI., Outcome Measurement: Showing Results in the Nonprofit Sector, in
USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS 15, 17
(Kathryn E. Newcomer ed., 1997). The authors state that "outputs are about the program,
whereas outcomes are about the participants." Id.
Welfare and related programs often have relied on measures of input (e.g.,
number of caseworkers), output (e.g., number of individuals completing job
readiness classes or error rates in determining eligibility) and efficiency (e.g.,
program dollars spent per $1 child support collected). However, outcome meas-

,
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ance contracting might result in the provider getting paid for putting someone in a job for a certain time period, but not for the time
spent by the provider in training, counseling, and job searching. 245
In essence, performance contracting aims to measure how well the
contractor is achieving program goals and the extent to which the
program is alleviating the social problem at issue. 246 Importantly, a
quantifiable assessment of outcomes helps to promote meaningful
competition among contract bidders, which, in turn, spurs accountability.247
In addition to assessing efficiency and effectiveness, another
important aspect of performance-based contracting is measuring
the quality of the service delivery from the beneficiary's perspective. To some degree, "quality-like beauty-lies in the eye of the
beholder."248 However, a major study of service quality indicators
concluded that the two most important dimensions of quality from
the customers' point of view are reliability and responsiveness. 249 In
the social service context, reliability means "providing services in a
consistent fashion; always being friendly, polite, and considerate ... [;] always attempting to understand client needs[; and] always speaking with clients in understandable language."25o Responsiveness means providing services in a timely manner. 251 Ensuring
quality delivery not only benefits clients, but also has been shown
to improve productivity. That is, it results in fewer errors, less paperwork, lower processing times, happier funding sources, lower
costs, and a better public image. 252
Performance contracting, however, is easier said than done.
The greatest difficulty arises in defining the hoped-for outcomes,
especially when the stakeholders have varying goals. "Performancebased contracting only works when based on relevant and quantifiable performance measures; therefore, a first step is evaluating the

ures (e.g., percentage of welfare caseload staying in jobs for six months) usually
have a more direct relationship to the established performance goals.
YATES, supra note 242, at 2.
245. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 22.
246. See YATES, supra note 242, at 2·3; see also MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7, at 3 ("Performance measurement combines three major accountability perspectives into one: 1. the efficiency perspective, 2. the quality perspective, and 3. the effectiveness perspective.").
247. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 79-98 (1989).
248. MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7, at 42.
249. [d. at 43. Other quality factors include accessibility, assurance, communication, competency, conformity, courtesy, durability, empathy, humaneness, performance, security, and tangibles. [d. at 42.
250. [d. at 43-44.
251. [d.

252. [d. at 6.
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objectives of a given service and figuring out how to assess success
and failure. Most cities are at best still reaching that first step."253
Not surprisingly, government managers have bemoaned the complexity of this process. 254
Yet another difficulty is that the staffs that formerly provided direct services usually lack the expertise to manage complex
social service contracts, which require "understanding competitive
markets, knowing how to value assets, making cost comparisons,
managing a competitive bid, and managing contracts in place[and] this list only scratches the surface."255 In fact, a detailed study
of how over 100 local government managers were conducting social
service contracting found that performance-based contracting principles were having little effect on actual contracting practices. 256
Most of the contract managers we interviewed appeared to manage the outsourcing
process in a "fly by the seat of your pants" manner rather in a manner that suggested a scientific or systematic approach to the outsourcing process. Often we
were told that this was the way the contract and outsourcing process had always
been handled, and in many cases the respondents described a "one approach fits
all contracts" method of outsourcing for services. 267

As a result, the study concluded that "most contract management
shops are being operated on the basis of tradition and a sort of folk
wisdom."258 The irony of privatization is that it relies on the very
entities deemed unfit to deliver social services to undertake the
complex mission of performance contracting. 259

253. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 22; see also O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 220 ("The
same things that make human-services delivery complex and difficult te measure, monitor, and
assess will also make it difficult to link dollars to the individual contribution that a specific provider makes to the health and well-being of his or her clients.").
254. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES
CHALLENGES IN ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS 14 (1997). For an enlightening description of the challenges faced by the New York Department of Homeless Services in
shifting to outcomes-based assessments, see Gordon J. Campbell & Elizabeth McCarthy, Conveying Mission Through Outcome Measurement: Services to the Homeless in New York City, 28 POL.
STUD. J. 338 (2000).
255. Moore & Hudson, supra note 56, at 29; see also O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 7; Jessica
Yates, Managing the Contracting Process for Results in Welfare Reform, WELFARE INFO.
NETWORK ISSUE NOTES (Welfare Info. Network, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1998, at
http://www.welfareinfo.org/contractissue.htm ("Good contract management involves significant
skills in program design, program planning, communications and evaluation. Federal, state and
local policies also set an important stage for contracting, especially the degree to which funds are
set aside for data collection, monitoring, technical assistance and evaluation.").
256. O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 3-4.
257. Id. at 4.
258. Id. Governments need to focus on payment strategies that minimize the risks of creaming and churning. See id. at 73-90 (describing a multitude of payment strategies and their effects); infra note 295 (defining terms "creaming" and "churning").
259. O'LOONEY, supra note 236, at 31.
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Like government agencies, nonprofit organizations also lack
experience using outcome measurement techniques. A study of
nonprofits found that "few organizations have been exposed to a
significant amount of training in implementing outcome measurement, analyzing it, and then using the resulting information."26o
Thus, the study concludes that "[m]uch more in the way of training
and technical assistance is needed."261 Religious organizations in
particular "have paid little attention to documenting activities."262
Accordingly, both governments and their social service contracting
partners will need to vastly improve their sophistication in defining
and monitoring contracts before contract law can begin to provide
accountability in a privatization regime.
4. The Vouchers Alternative

Vouchers are one option that have been touted as a solution
to the problems of defining and monitoring contracts, as well as a
means for increasing program quality. 263 Vouchers are expressly
approved as a charitable choice option. Under a vouchers program,
beneficiaries are given a voucher for certain services that they can
redeem at the provider of their choice. This is how food stamps,
Medicaid benefits, and certain public housing programs operate. 264

260. ELAINE MORLEY ET AL., OUTCOME MEASUREMENT IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
CURRENT PRACTICES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (2001). Nonprofits have traditionally focused on
administrative factors rather than outcomes.
Outcome measurement is new to most private nonprofit organizations. Nonprofit organizations are more often familiar with monitoring and reporting such
information as the number of clients served, the quantity of services, programs,
or activities provided, the number of volunteers or volunteer hours contributed,
and the amount of donations received. These are important data, but they do
not help nonprofit managers or constituents understand how well they are helping their clients; that is, such statistics provide administrative information
about programs, but not about the program's results.
Id. at 5.
261. Id. at 10.
262. Griener, supra note 20, at 5; see also INDEPENDENT SECTOR, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS
CONGREGATIONS: MEASURING THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIETY 9 (2000) (noting that religious
organizations collect data less frequently than other nonprofits, perhaps because stakeholders
are less likely to ask congregations about accomplishments); Caryle Murphy, A Matter of Faith
and Funds for Serving Area's Needy; Restrictions Divide Religion-Based Programs, WASH. POST,
Mar. 18, 2001, at Al (describing faith-based programs in which the groups acknowledge that
they "have no formal system of tracking those who have completed their missions' programs, ...
and can offer only anecdotal evidence about the programs' effectiveness").
263. Vouchers are also seen as a way to avoid First Amendment entanglement problems. See
infra Part IV.C.
264. See Paul Posner et ai., A Survey of Voucher Use: Variations and Common Elements, in
VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 503, 522-39 (C. Eugene Steuerle et ai. eds.,
2000) (listing voucher programs at federal, state, and local levels); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Social
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Vouchers apply a market-based approach to social services, which
posits that underperforming providers will be pushed out of the
market by competitive forces. 265 Whether the market metaphor
works in this context is not clear, however, because the beneficiaries are not necessarily in a position to gain necessary information
about available services or to evaluate services rendered. As Martha Minow explains:
The sheer fact that the arena involves subsistence (as well as day care, substance
abuse treatment, and other services crucial to daily survival) renders questionable
the assertion that recipients are freely and autonomously choosing. Autonomous
choice is in jeopardy when the individual has no money, food, or housing and is of·
fered these necessities on conditions that she might quickly refuse under other cir·
cumstances. 266

Moreover, a voucher-based system presumes a competitive
market of providers. While food stamp recipients obviously have a
bevy of food providers from which to choose, social services agencies
are not nearly as numerous. 267 In certain jurisdictions, there may be
only one provider, making the notion of choice meaningless. The
voucher system, with its veneer of "choice," also poses the risk that
governments will fail to monitor service delivery, on the theory that
the beneficiaries are doing the job for them.
In reality, voucher programs can never be purely market
based and inevitably require extensive regulation to ensure quality
control.268 Thus, to the degree vouchers can playa role in improving

Services and the Market, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1405, 1407-09 (1983); C. Eugene Steuerle, Common
Issues for Voucher Programs, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra, at 3,
3-4.
265. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 264, at 1407.
266. Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of Welfare
as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 535 (1999); see also Burt S. Barnow, Vouchers for Federal Targeted Training Programs, in VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 264,
at 224, 244 (noting that "participants in training programs may lack appropriate information
about their own skills and aptitudes as well as the characteristics of training vendors"); Steuerle,
supra note 264, at 19-20 (describing the issues raised by voucher recipients' capability to choose
benefits).
267. JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY 55 (1996) ("The theory assumes that
there is competition among suppliers or vendors and that clients, or voucher holders, are informed, autonomous purchasers. In practice, such conditions rarely exist .... ").
268. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 264, at 1409 (noting that vouchers "impose direct regulations that reflect policymakers' concerns about both suppliers' monopoly power and beneficiaries' limited information and scarce 'shopping time' "); Steuerle, supra note 264, at 21, 31 ("Some
standards and regulation are inevitable. At a minimum, the government will try to ensure that
the voucher is spent on the goods and services prescribed and not on those proscribed, and that
only 'eligible' individuals receive the vouchers.").
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accountability, it will have to be through oversight regulations,269
such as those proposed in this Article. A pure voucher system is not
only unrealistic, but it gives the veneer of accountability where
none exists. 27o
III. PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY OF
SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS

Currently, the federal welfare law says very little about the
accountability of private entities. Section 104 of the PRA provides
that religious organizations contracting to provide welfare assistance are subject to the same regulations as other contractors "to
account in accord with generally accepted auditing principles for
the use of such funds."271 Yet a religious organization can segregate
its fed,eral and nonfederal funds and thereby limit any audit to the
federal funds, even when both funding streams contribute to the
same activity.272 Also, the Act provides an enforcement mechanism
for any party seeking to enforce its rights under section 104;
namely, the various prOVISIOns concerning nondiscrimination
against religious groups and beneficiaries. 273 Thus, the notion of
accountability embodied in the charitable choice provision is limited
to fiscal matters and enforcing the statutory balance between competing First Amendment concerns. Nowhere does the PRA focus on
ensuring that public dollars result in quality services, perhaps assuming that the market will impose quality results either through
contracting or vouchers. As discussed above, however, neither contracts nor vouchers alone can currently guarantee quality.

269. Stephen Macedo argues that conditions that attach to vouchers should reflect public
purposes:
[I]nsofar as those private agencies voluntarily accept a share of public monies,
we should hope that public policy tilts in favor of such public values as fairness
among all citizens, equal access, and openness to outsiders .... If religious believers sometimes feel they are being asked to "tone down" their religiosity,
that will often be the price of agreeing to serve as a provider of public services.
Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations,
and Liberal Public Values, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 417, 448 (2000).
270. Studies of voucher-oriented job training programs show little effectiveness. Barnow, supra note 266, at 244-46. The author reviewing these studies concludes that any job training
voucher program "should include assessment and counseling to determine what training is appropriate for the participants and screening of vendors for quality of training and appropriate
placement rates." [d. at 245.
271. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104(h)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2163 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
604a (Supp. III 1997».
272. [d. § 104(h)(2).
273. [d. § 104(c), (g).
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The PRA makes a nod towards procedural fairness. States
must "set forth objective criteria for the delivery of benefits and the
determination of eligibility and for fair and equitable treatment."274
Presumably, private entities that contract with the state would
have to abide by these objective criteria and fairness requirements.
Yet there is no formal mechanism in the statute for enforcing these
procedural due process norms.275
In addition, the Act requires various forms of data collection
and reporting,276 and the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") has issued detailed regulations governing how TANF
funds are to be spent.277 However, the statute and the regulations
are focused on ensuring that federal funds are spent in line with
federal goals (to make sure that no one receives benefits for more
than five years, to ensure that adults are participating in work activities, and so forth).278 The regulations have little bearing on accountability to the beneficiaries themselves. 279
The lack of specific accountability mechanisms at the federal
level is largely the result of Congress's desire to give the states and
their localities flexibility to develop their own welfare programs and
to devolve discretion downward. However, the state and municipal
governments have generated very little formal statutory or regulatory guidance with regard to accountability of private contractors.
Thus, presumably any accountability mechanisms are being established through the contracting process. 280 Yet state and local governments are, by and large, neither prepared nor skilled in contracting for performance. 281 An in-depth study of welfare contract274. Id. § 402(a)(1)(B)(iii), 110 Stat. at 2114 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B)(iii) (Supp. III
1997».
275. See generally Gilman, supra note 19 (detailing the lack of enforcement mechanisms to
ensure that procedural due process norms are met).
276. Pub. L. No. 104·193, § 411, 110 Stat. 2105, 2148 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 611
(Supp. III 1997».
277. See 64 Fed. Reg. 17,885 (Apr. 12, 1999).
278. Id. ("How will we hold a State accountable for acbieving the work objectives of TANF?");
64 Fed. Reg. 17,890-91 (Apr. 12, 1999) (indicating that states will be penalized for failing to complete timely reports, failing to get the required number of adults into work activities, failing to
penalize noncooperative recipients, and failing to comply with the five-year limit on federal assistance). See generally 64 Fed. Reg. 17,719, 17,857-878, 17,890-914 (Apr. 12, 1999) (setting forth
regulations governing accountability ofTANF funds).
279. The HHS has stated that states that improperly sanction welfare recipients may themselves be sanctioned. 64 Fed. Reg. 17,793-94 (Apr. 12, 1999).
280. One study found that detailed charitable choice guidelines have been codified into formal contracts only in Texas, Arizona, Indiana, and Wisconsin. See Griener, supra note 20, at 3-4.
281. Barbara Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished Democracy
in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to- Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1603
(2001) ("Formal contract management is largely absent in local government procurement, and
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ing in the City of Baltimore found that the contracts contained "no
meaningful benchmarks, outcomes, or control mechanisms" and
that the city government was not evaluating "the vendor services
for which it spends public funds and recipients' time-limited welfare support."282
As a result, in Baltimore and elsewhere, private entities are
operating with very few constraints on their discretion. Moreover,
devolution, by its very nature, makes it hard to assess the impact of
federal policies because it creates a multitude of government funders and an even greater number of service deliverers. 283 Thus, the
current statutory regime does little to protect beneficiaries. Of even
greater concern is President Bush's goal of easing the regulatory
burdens for faith-based providers alone. Not only does this raise
First Amendment issues because of the preferential treatment it
would accord to religious providers, but it also means that churches
could be providing services in an accountability vacuum.
A. The Value of Citizen Participation

By contrast, a model for accountability in social service privatization should focus on quality service delivery at three progressive levels: preventing abuses; monitoring for quality; and enforcing
quality standards. Beneficiaries should play a key role throughout
this process as they have unique insights and information about
"the needs, opportunities, priorities, and special dynamics at work"
in their communities that are essential to designing a productive
program. 284 As one far-reaching study of social service privatization

few people responsible are procurement professionals or bave any formal training in contract
management."); see also supra notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
282. Bezdek, supra note 281, at 1603. She writes that for "$60 million, Baltimore got 2000
jobs for more than 10,000 [welfare) families." Id. at 1602.
283. See Mark Greenberg, Welfare Reform and Devolution: Looking Back and Forward,
BROOKINGS REV., Summer 2001, at 20. Greenberg concludes that when the federal law is up for
reauthorization in 2002, legislators should improve accountability by generating better information about what states are doing, how funds are being spent, and how beneficiaries are heing
impacted. Id. at 24.
284. ROBERT J. CHASKIN, THE FORD FOUNDATION'S NEIGHBORHOOD AND FAMILY INITIATIVE:
TOWARD A MODEL OF COMPREHENSIVE, NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED DEVELOPMENT 16 (1992) (noting
that "residents' knowledge may provide important insight into how the provision of services
should be carried out, or where a certain facility should be placed"); see also Arthur Earl Bonfield,
Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits,
or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 540 (1970) (arguing that the interested public should participate in the rule making process). In addition, public participation can ensure that an agency is
"prepared for certain problems that could arise from those rules' application, or the community's
reaction to tbem." Id. at 541.
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found, " 'Where there is a willingness on the part of contracting
partners to involve a broad range of stakeholders in decisionmaking, there is greater overall satisfaction with service delivery, the
public policy makjng process and the contracting relationship.' "285
Moreover, empowering beneficiaries to take control over· matters
directly affecting them can not only lead to more efficient service
delivery, but is also a worthy goal in itself286-and one heavily promoted by privatization proponents on both the left and right of the
political spectrum. 287 Empowerment results not only when people
are given a means to influence policies that affect them, but also
when they gain valuable skills through the participatory process. 288
Finally, encouraging public participation fits within our democratic
norms, under which the government derives its authority directly
from the people. 289

In federal law, public participation has been recognized as an integral aspect of decisionmaking in the areas of environmental law, public housing, and otber programs that disproportionately affect poor people. See, e.g., MARY GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W. KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 5-7 (1981); Marcus E. Ethridge, Procedures
for Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy: An Assessment of Policy Effects, in CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING 115 (Jack DeSario & Stuart Langton eds., 1987);
Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted Terrain of Community
Participation, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (2000-2001); Resident Advisory Board and Public Participation in the PHA Plan Adoption Process, 30 HOUSING L. BULL. 173 (National Housing Law
Center, Nov.-Dec. 2000) (describing public participation requirements in public housing programs). These norms have generally not been included in welfare delivery, likely because prior to
the PRA, governments basically handed out checks and were not charged with changing behavlOr.

285. Yates, supra note 255, at 6 (quoting JENICE L. VIEW, A MEANS TO AN END: T.HE ROLE OF
NONPROFIT/GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING IN SUSTAINING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1995». Likewise,
experts in performance contracting urge that clients be a part of selecting performance measures. See MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7, at 102.
286. Empowerment "involves a sense of perceived control, of competence, a critical awareness
of one's environment, and involvement in activities that, in fact, exert contro!." HANDLER, supra
note 267, at 122.
287. Id. at 5. Handler states:
Initially, citizen empowerment was tbe program of the traditional or liberal
Left, but that is no longer true. For a long time, conservatives have talked of
empowering "mediating institutions" and of market-based incentives as a way
of achieving citizen autonomy and bureaucratic accountability . . . . Citizen or
community empowerment is also urged by minorities who champion the preservation of cultural diversity, by activists and academics who celebrate the vi,ctories of the subordinate against systems of social control, and by a wide range of
"new" social-movement or post-modern groups under the broad labels of feminism, environmentalism, and peace.
Id.
288. See, e.g., CHASKIN, supra note 284, at 13, 17.
289. See Bonfield, supra note 284, at 541; Spyke, supra note 101, at 267. For a thorough discussion and critique of the theories supporting citizen participation initiatives, see McFarlane,
supra note 284, at 892-929.
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Participation is particularly essential where administrative
agencies are making the decisions, as they are not subject to majoritarian political processes. Thus, public participation is itself an
accountability tool,290 To be sure, public participation can be costly,
not only in monetary terms, but also in terms of time, efficiency,
and, sometimes, the quality of the deliberations. 291 However, in the
context of social service contracting, the costs of non participation
are severe-keeping beneficiaries away from the table can result in
ineffective programs that squander public funds. Nonparticipation
also eliminates opportunities for empowering the targeted populations, one of the goals of social service delivery. Although the populations at issue are particularly vulnerable, they can provide valuable insights as long as they are provided with information and resources to enable their participation in the service delivery process.
Thus, state and local governments will need to find a balance between increasing citizen participation and the competing concerns
of cost and efficiency. Certainly, cutting back on accountability
mechanisms is not the answer.
When discussing the value of citizen participation, the question inevitably arises as to how much ultimate control the citizens
should have and what role they should play.292 Citizen participation

290. Public participation is most effective where: (1) all affected persons are included, (2)
procedures are open and include educational tools "to make the information usable by unsophisticated participants," (3) procedures are fair, and (4) procedures result in public involvement in
the decision. See John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory
Boards in Environmental Decisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903, 952-53 (1998); see also Cheryl Simrell King et ai., The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Public Participation in Public
Administration, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 317 (1998) (listing barriers to participation and some ways
to overcome them).
291. As to the costs of mass participation, see Bonfield, supra note 284, at 543 ("There is an
obvious need to conduct our government efficiently, expeditiously, effectively, and inexpensively.
No rule making scheme may be considered acceptable unless it fairly reconciles these latter values with the societal interest in maximizing public participation in the development of administrative regulations."); Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for
Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997) (exploring the costs of public
participation).
292. The complexities of this issue are well illustrated in ROBERT HALPERN, REBUILDING THE
INNER CITY 167-94 (1995). Halpern discusses community involvement in neighborhood-based
social services during the 1960s. During this era, participatory norms "meant involvement of
community residents in program-level policy setting, as volunteers and as paid staff." Id. at 17677. Conflicts arose as to whether clients should rely on outside guidance or whether they could
actually run programs themselves. Id. at 181-83. Halpern concludes that
[n]eighborhood-based services in poor neighborhoods have helped both to sustain and inadvertently to maintain those neighborhoods .... The notion of rebuilding a sense of community through networks of neighborhood-based services can only be taken so far when the majority of poor children and families
are geographically and socially isolated from the rest of society.
Id. at 194.
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can mean anything from belonging to a rubber stamp advisory
committee to having voting power on policymaking boards to outright citizen control-and all the gradations of power sharing along
this spectrum. 293 Mter all, simply giving people a forum to express
their views does not mean that those views will be taken into account. To the contrary, such a strategy can be used as a political
tool to give the appearance of participation, when in fact, there is
none. In the context of privatization, as discussed below, representatives from the class of beneficiaries at issue should be given voting power on government bodies throughout the procurement process (even in deciding whether privatization should be used in the
first place) and during its monitoring phases. Voting power ensures
that beneficiaries have a meaningful voice in shaping the services
that affect them.
Given the range of social services that are provided under
contract with private entities, it is beyond the scope of this Article
to specify detailed regulatory or contract terms that should govern
the relationships between and among the various stakeholders.
However, the general principles set forth here have widespread applicability and are derived from performance management literature, studies of community participation, and reports of "best practices" in the area of privatized social services.

B. Preventing Abuses
From the outset, a government can take several steps to ensure that the social services for which it contracts are delivered
fairly, efficiently, and effectively. Governments need to use the
techniques of performance contracting and measurement, about
which there is substantial literature, knowledge, and training opportunities. 294 A government agency considering privatization
should bring the various stakeholders together to define precise
programmatic goals, transmit those goals clearly to contractors,
and then devise a strategy for measuring whether contractor performance meets those goals. Beneficiary participation is especially
important in performance contracting. The downside of an emphasis on results is that it can push providers to serve the easiest popu-

293. Sherry Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 216,
216-24 (1969).
294. See generally MARTIN & KETTNER, supra note 7; O'LOONEY, supra note 236; SMITH &
LIPSKY, supra note 106; USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND
NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 244.
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lations first and/or to discourage hard-to-serve individuals from
pursuing assistance. 295 It can also affect how results are defined.
For instance, the definition of "work" satisfying welfare reform requirements could be anything from a minimum wage, menial job to
a job with training and opportunities for advancement. For these
reasons, it is important to involve all stakeholders, including beneficiaries (or their surrogates in the case of certain populations) in
the process of defining goals and desired outcomes.
Despite the proven effectiveness of performance contracting,
it is playing little role in most social service contracting schemes, in
part because of government inexperience. 296 This means that governments are going to have to make substantial investments in incorporating these methods into their procurement systems. At a
minimum, they will have to train staffs, purchase appropriate information technologies, and maintain ongoing efforts to keep up
with developments and strategies in this burgeoning field. 297 Moreover, governments may need to include funds for contractors to engage in outcome measurement. 298 All of this costs money. However,
there are significant long-term costs to the lawsuits, failed contracts, and misspent funds that would otherwise occur. Accordingly,
federal and state legislatures should consider making some charitable choice funds available for training in performance contracting.
At each stage, the procurement process should involve the
program beneficiaries. They can play valuable roles in discussing

295. These incentives are often called "creaming" (serving only the best clients) and "churning" (discouraging harder-to· assist populations). See DIANE PAULSELL & ROBERT G. WOOD, THE
COMMUNITY SOLUTIONS INITIATIVE: EARLY lMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCES (1999) (finding that
contractors providing employment services to welfare recipients were implementing selective
admissions policies), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.comJPDFs/community.pdf; Yates,
supra note 255, at 2 ("[C]ritics suggest that [performance contracting] encourages contractors to
focus their resources on the easier-to-serve clients and spend less time with harder-to-serve
ones.").
296. See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
297. See Cheryle A. Broom & Marilyn Jackson, Performance Measurement Training, in
USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note
244, at 79 (describing training challenges and proposing an approach); Kathryn Newcomer, Us·
ing Performance Measurement to Improve Programs, in USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 244, at 5, 10 ("Abundant political support and resources are essential to ensure that performance measurement systems are designed
with adequate input from key stakeholders and with technical expertise to ensure useful systems. Consultation with stakeholders in oversight bodies, service beneficiaries, and internal staff
takes time and resource support.").
298. See MORLEY ET AL., supra note 260, at 10; see also Harry P. Hatry, Where the Rubber
Meets the Road: Performance Measurement for State and Local Public Agencies, in USING PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT TO IMPROVE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 297, at 31,
37 ("Many local private nonprofit programs are quite small and without personnel experienced in
quantitative technique and program evaluation.").
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whether to contract out a particular service, identifying the scope of
services needed, assisting in evaluating bids, suggesting points for
negotiation, and selecting final bids. However, it is not enough for
agencies to make opportunities for participation available. Rather,
especially where disenfranchised populations are involved, agencies
need to take affirmative steps to identify and include affected persons, or their surrogates, in the case of children, mentally disabled
persons, and other persons who lack the ability to participate meaningfully.299 Such steps should include outreach efforts to local community and neighborhood leaders, scheduling meetings at times
when working people can attend, holding meetings in the affected
communities, and the like. 30o It is also essential to involve the public at the start of a proposed program, rather than asking for comment on an already finalized agency proposal-by that time, an
agency has an overriding interest, driven both by efficiency concerns and self-interest, to push that specific proposal through. 30l

C. Monitoring for Quality
Once a contract has been awarded, the procurement agency
must monitor its implementation to ensure its integrity with contract terms, and, in the area of charitable choice, to ensure that
First Amendment guidelines are being followed. Effective performance contracting requires the government to conduct data collection

299. "When communities receive inadequate notice or receive information that they cannot
understand the participatory nature of the decision-making processes is called into serious question." Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance,
and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775,
833 (1998). Foster suggests four questions which should be asked when evaluating the legitimacy
of a participatory decisionmaking process involving siting of environmental hazardous waste.
The questions are just as relevant for social service delivery:
(1) whether those most affected by the decision either have an opportunity to
participate directly or to be represented in each phase of the decision-making
process; (2) whether the community is informed adequately about all available
information regarding the proposed action and whether such information is accessible; (3) whether the agency is responsive to community knowledge and concerns; and (4) whether decision-making power and influence is shared between
those asked to bear the greatest risk, those who stand to benefit the most, and
the institutions, administrators, and technical experts responsible for the ultimate decision.
Id. at 834-35.
300. See HANDLER, supra note 267, at 167 ("Participation on the part of the dependent person is difficult, often anxiety-producing, and time-consuming.").
301. "[Tlhe difference between reacting to amend the margins of a proposal that you had no
part in creating, and starting from scratch to create a plan that addresses concerns you consider
paramount, is vast." Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing the Central
City with Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689, 698 (1994).
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on financial spending, processes, and outcomes; to compare results
among similarly situated providers; to evaluate the data collected;
and to report the results of the data to all the affected stakeholders.302 In carrying out these tasks, it would be particularly
helpful for local and state governments to create centralized clearinghouses to compare such data, to gather examples of "best practices," and to serve as resource centers on performance contracting
techniques. In addition, in selecting contractors and in monitoring
their performance, governments may want to rely on national accreditation bodies that have developed rigorous standards for
evaluating providers and have specialized expertise in their fields.
Beneficiaries can also assist government in monitoring service delivery. To begin with, they should serve on reviewing panels
in determining whether to renew existing contracts. Also, on an ongoing basis, government agencies should conduct on-site visits and
customer interviews. Beneficiaries can be surveyed as to satisfaction with services, as well as to specific aspects of service delivery
such as timeliness, helpfulness of the staff, and comprehensibility
of materials. 303 Following up with client surveys to determine the
status of beneficiaries during and after service delivery can also
provide valuable information about outcomes. In certain circumstances, it may be appropriate for the government to use "testers"
to get an objective view of the services being provided. 304 Sharing
the results of data collection with the general public, government
and contractor personnel, and other stakeholders can also heighten
accountability. Beneficiaries should have a way to voice their concerns, even if surveying efforts do not cover them. Thus, governments should consider establishing an ombudsperson in an independent agency to listen to beneficiary complaints and to assist in
resolving them. In brief, monitoring involves casting the broadest
net possible to gather and share information, recognizing that beneficiaries are a key source of accurate information.

302. See MORLEY ET AL., supra note 260, at 7-8.
303. See id. at 6. Where the service beneficiary is unable to participate in monitoring due to
youth, disability, or the like, caretakers and family members can be surveyed. Ct. Freeman,
supra note 79, at 608 n.264 ("Indeed, third party oversight by either family members of residents
or community groups already seems to be a crucial ingredient in the quality of nursing home
care.").
304. See Diller, supra note 75, at 1215.
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D. Enforcement
While effective prevention and monitoring will go far to ensure accountability, meaningful enforcement of accountability
mechanisms is a necessary last resort. Without the threat of enforcement, there is little incentive for either government or its contractors to implement accountability reforms. Given the reality that
most service contracts become self-perpetuating, and that governments and their contractors develop mutually reinforcing relationships,305 outside pressure is needed to counterbalance this potentially static state of affairs. Express rights to enforce accountability
mechanisms should be included in contracts and regulations governing social service programs. 306

IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND REGULATING FAITH-BASED
PROVIDERS

Charitable choice poses a challenge to the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, under which "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."307 Opponents of charitable choice charge that direct
monetary grants to religious organizations violate the wall of separation between church and state. 30B Supporters counter that charitable choice fulfills the First Amendment's goal of treating religion
and nonreligion equally.309 Not surprisingly, this issue has received
a great deal of scholarly attention. 310 Yet given the lack of doctrinal

305. See HANDLER, supra note 267, at 92-93.
306. A government may wish to include some sort of administrative exhaustion, mediation,
or negotiation requirements hefore authorizing lawsuits.
307. U.S. CaNST. amend. 1.
308. See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Charitable Choice, in
WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 219, 220 (noting that
"[b]ecause of [the] essential distinction between church and state, partnerships between religious
organizations and government are constitutionally precarious undertakings").
309. See, e.g., Carl Esbeck, The Neutral Treatment of Religion and Faith-Based Social Service Providers: Charitable Choice and Its Critics, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 173, 175 (explaining that under cbaritable choice, social service
providers "are to be selected only with regard to which providers can effectively deliver the contract services" and thus that "religion is neither favored nor disfavored"). Supporters also contend that denying religious groups access to generally available government funds is discrimination in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 184-85.
310. See generally Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny Dome with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Charitable Choice, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 149 (2000) (arguing that charitable choice will have adverse
consequences by increasing government regulation of religious organizations); Steven K. Green,
The Ambiguous Embrace: Government and Faith-Based Schools and Social Agencies, 86
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clarity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will rule on the constitutionality of
charitable choice provisions, and case law supports arguments on
both sides. 311 The issue is clouded by the fact that the Religion
Clauses serve a variety of purposes and support a variety of readings. 312 Moreover, an obvious tension exists between the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clauses, which, if taken to their logical
extremes, conflict with one another. 313 For instance, if government
allows religious groups total freedom to practice their religion and
thereby exempts them from certain types of regulation, the government may end up establishing a religion. 314 Conversely, if the
government cannot grant religious groups specific accommodations
from neutral regulatory schemes, the result may be a loss of free
exercise for those groups.315

CORNELL L. REV. 692 (2001) (arguing that charitable choice treats religious groups more favora·
bly than secular groups); Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Sante Fe,
Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARy L. REV. 771 (2001)
(explaining that neutrality rather than separationism is driving the Supreme Court's analysis of
government funding cases); Minow, supra note 266 (concluding that partnerships between
governmental and private groups, including religious groups, further both pluralism and
individual freedom).
311. As one commentator summarized Establishment Clause jurisprudence, "Few areas of
the law today are so riven with wild generalizations and hair-splitting distinctions, so given to
grand statements of principle and petty applications of precept, so rife with selective readings of
history and inventive renderings of precedent." JOHN W1TTE, JR., RELlG10N AND THE AMERlCAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 182 (2000).
312. See generally WITTE, supra note 311. In his book, Witte describes the principles underlying the Religion Clauses as understood by the Founders, and how these principles have ebbed
and flowed in the Court's jurisprudence. The six main principles are: (1) liberty of conscience; (2)
free exercise of religion; (3) religious pluralism; (4) religious equality; (5) separation of church
and state; and (6) disestablishment of religion. Id. at 4. He argues that all of these principles
should inform our current understanding of the Religion Clauses.
313. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms,
and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."). One
commentator has explained this tension:
Just as the Free Exercise Clause seems to be saying to avoid burdening religion, the Establishment Clause seems to be telling us not to make any special
deals for religious groups. Because we're not sure of the proper baseline, we
don't know when an accommodation for religion "advances" it and when it
merely "accommodates" a burden created by the government.
DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 281 (1998).
314. See Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income
Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 116-17 (1991).
315. See Minow, supra note 266, at 510:
If a state cannot close schools and businesses on Sundays or Good Friday for
fear of establishing Christianity as an official or preferred religion, that prohibition burdens individuals' abilities to observe their Sabbath and their holy
days. If the state cannot exempt a synagogue from municipal historic preservation codes, then public rules may infringe on a religious group's selfgovernment.
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Even if, as is likely, some form of charitable choice survives
constitutional challenges, the inquiry does not end there. Rather,
there is the subsequent question, which has received far less attention, as to what lengths government may go in ensuring accountability from its sectarian contracting partners. 316 Some religious
organizations fear that if the expenditure of charitable choice funds
is regulated, the government will become excessively entangled in
their work and that they will lose their uniquely spiritual character
as a result. This line of argument implicates both Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause rights. At the same time, if government exempts religious organizations from otherwise generally applicable
regulations, the government may violate the Establishment Clause
by favoring religion over nonreligion. This part considers these concerns. First, this part addresses whether government can provide
direct aid to religious organizations for social services. This issue is
intertwined with the regulation issue and is thus a necessary predicate to discussing the latter issue. Second, this part considers
whether the government can regulate religious organizations despite their special constitutional status. Third, having decisively
answered the second question in the affirmative, this part then
asks what the limitations on such regulation are. Fourth, this part
considers whether legislatures may permissively choose to accommodate religious organizations and exempt them from regulations
otherwise applicable to secular providers. This part concludes that
regulating religious organizations that accept charitable choice
funds is not only necessary to achieve program objectives but also
constitutional.
A. The Direct Aid Dilemma

The direct aid question is inextricably linked with the regulation question, and thus must be addressed as a preliminary matter. This is because a direct aid program can be invalidated under
the Establishment Clause if the government heavily monitors the
use of the aid to ensure that it is not used for religious purposes. 317

316. One notable exception is Carl H. Esbeck, Government Regulation of Religiously Based
Social Services: The First Amendment Considerations, 19 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343 (1992).
317. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997) ("Whether a government aid program reo
suits in such an entanglement has consistently been an aspect of our Establishment Clause
analysis. We have considered entanglement both in the course of assessing whether an aid program has an impermissible effect of advancing religion .... ").
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In other words, the court may strike down an aid program as excessivelyentangling.
The leading case involving government aid to religiously affiliated social service providers is Bowen v. Kendrick, a 1988 decision in which the Court addressed the constitutionality of the Adolescent Family Life Act ("AFLA").31B Under AFLA, the federal government provided grants to public and nonprofit private organizations, including religious organizations, to give care, educational
services, and counseling to pregnant teenagers. 319 However, AFLA
funds could not be granted to programs that provided abortion services, counseling, or referrals. 320 The Court ruled that AFLA was
constitutional on its face, but that individual AFLA grants might
violate the Establishment Clause as applied. 321 The Court's opinion
largely hinged on its conclusion that as long as funds were not going towards "pervasively sectarian" organizations, there was no risk
of government advancing, inhibiting, or excessively entangling itself with religion. 322 At that time, the ban on direct aid to pervasively sectarian institutions had a long pedigree in cases involving
aid to parochial schools. 323 Although AFLA survived facial attack,

318. 487 u.s. 589, 593 (1988). The only other case involving government aid to social services
is Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297·300 (1899), in which the Court upheld a congressional
appropriation for construction to a Catholic hospital, reasoning formalistically that the hospital
was incorporated as a secular institution. In Bowen, the court cited to Bradfield as exemplifying
"the long history of cooperation and interdependency between governments and charitable or
religious organizations." 487 U.S. at 609.
319. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593·96.
320. [d. at 596·97.
321. [d. at 618·22. The Court applied the three· part, purpose·effect·entanglement test for
analyzing Establishment Clause challenges set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612·
13 (1971). Under Lemon, the Court asks whether the statute (1) is motivated by an impermissi·
ble purpose; (2) has as its primary effect the advancement of religion; or (3) requires excessive
entanglement between church and state. Failure to pass any of these prongs is fatal to the statute at issue. [d. Although the Court has never disavowed Lemon, it recently repackaged the test
in Agostini, 521 U.S. at 218-40. The Court now puts the excessive entanglement inquiry into the
effects test. Thus, the Court first asks whether the statute has a secular purpose, and second,
looks to the effect of the statute by asking whether the government aid results in (1) government
indoctrination; (2) defines its recipients by reference to religion; or (3) creates an excessive entanglement. [d. at 232-34.
322. See Bowen, 487 U.s. at 610-18.
323. Through the 1970s and 1980s very few school aid programs survived the Lemon test.
See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.s. 229, 255 (1977) (holding that the state cannot loan instructional materials to private schools or provide transportation for field trips by private schools),
overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372-73
(1975) (holding that the state may loan textbooks to religious schools, but not other school supplies or film and may not fund counseling and personnel), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808;
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973) (holding that the
state cannot give tax deductions to low-income parents who send their children to private
schools); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609 (holding that the state cannot reimburse religious schools for
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the Court remanded the case back to the district court to determine
whether AFLA was unconstitutional as applied, that is, whether
some AFLA aid was flowing to pervasively sectarian grantees
and/or whether the aid was used to fund specifically religious activities. 324 The Court indicated that either of these uses would be
unconstitutional. 325
Bowen raises several issues for evaluating the constitutionality of charitable choice. It is fair to read Bowen as approving government funding of religious organizations to combat social problems as long as the aid money finances only secular activities, and
advocates have argued as much. Thus, Bowen embodies the Court's
move away from separationist rhetoric 326 toward a more neutral
vision, under which both the secular and sectarian are entitled to
equal treatment by government. 327 However, Bowen also takes a
strong stance against the funding of "pervasively sectarian" institutions. The Court has vaguely defined pervasively sectarian organizations as those in which the "secular activities cannot be separated
from sectarian ones."328 Parochial schools and houses of worship fit

portion of costs of teacher's salaries). By contrast, the Court upheld various government aid
programs to religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning on the theory that college·age
students are less subject to indoctrination and that colleges are not permeated with religion. See,
e.g., Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 766·67 (1976) (upholding state annual grants of
fIfteen percent per pupil); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681·84 (1971) (holding that federal
grants may be made for construction of college facilities for other than religious activities).
324. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620·22.
325. In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that expecting religious organizations to refrain
from promoting religion was unrealistic. He argued:
There is a very real and important difference between running a soup kitchen
or a hospital and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult
decisions facing them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense, and of
creating an appearance that the government is endorsing the medium and the
message, is much greater when the religious organization is directly engaged in
pedagogy, with the express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, than
where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food, or shelter.
[d. at 641 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
326. The Court most forcefully endorsed a separationist reading of the Religion Clauses in a
series of cases involving aid to parochial schools in the 1970s. See infra note 323 (citing cases).
327. For a description of the Court's move toward a neutrality theory of the Religion Clauses,
see Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 66·72 (2002).
328. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755. Various factors courts have used to dete~mine whether an en·
tity is pervasively sectarian include whether: (1) the organization is located near houses of wor·
ship; (2) worship or religious instruction is an important part of the organization's program; (3)
religious symbols and activities are found in the facility; (4) operation of the institution is consid·
ered an integral part of the sponsoring faith's religious mission; (5) staff are subject to discipline
and control of religious authorities; (6) participants must attend religious devotions; (7) the or·
ganization is directly funded by religious groups; and (8) the organization discriminates on the
basis of religion with regard to clients or staff. See Brownstein, supra note 308, at 222.
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squarely within this definition. 329 Charitable choice would appear to
violate the pervasively sectarian test, because its very purpose is to
involve churches, synagogues, mosques, and the like in welfare delivery without requiring these organizations to set up affiliated,
nonsectarian nonprofits. 330 Yet since Bowen, the Court has moved
away from the "pervasively sectarian" test. That is, a majority of
the Court no longer considers determinative the nature of the or~
ganization receiving the aid.
Most recently, in Mitchell v. Helms, six Justices upheld a
federal program that provided educational equipment and materials such as computers, software, and VCRs, to public and private
schools, including religious schools. There was no majority opinion
in the case. 331 The plurality, consisting of Justices Thomas,
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, concluded that the Establishment
Clause is not violated as long as the aid lacks religious content and
is distributed based on neutral criteria. 332 For the plurality, the actual use of the aid or character of the recipient is irrelevant. 333 Although the plurality cautioned that direct monetary aid to religious
entities raises special Establishment Clause "dangers," it suggested
that such dangers could be diminished if there are neutral criteria
for distribution and an intervening element of private choice as to
where the aid is used. 334 The plurality was unconcerned by government funds going to individuals who then choose where to spend
the money, reasoning that these private decisions remove any intimation of government coercion or indoctrination. 335
The Mitchell concurrence, consisting of Justices O'Connor
and Breyer, which held the deciding votes on the aid question, concluded that the government could provide religiously neutral aid to
parochial schools as long as the aid was not in fact diverted for religious purposes. 336 Echoing Bowen, the concurrence stated that from
now on, "[t]o establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must
prove that the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for reli-

329. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 621.
330. It is questionable whether setting up independent, but affiliated non profits eases the
First Amendment concerns. See infra note 343.
331. 530 U.S. 793, 801 (2000) (plurality opinion).
332. Id. at 826.
333. The plurality argued that the pervasively sectarian standard should be eliminated, calling it offensive. Id. "[Hjostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful pedigree
that we do not hesitate to disavow." Id. at 828.
334. Id. at 818-19 & n.8.
335. Id. at 816.
336. Id. at 840 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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gious purposes."337 The concurrence parted company with the plurality in arguing that neutrality in distribution does not, by itself,
satisfy Establishment Clause concerns. 338 Nevertheless, the concurrence did suggest that while direct grants that finance religious
practices are unconstitutional,339 the intervening element of private
choice could support the actual diversion of funds to religious practices. 34o Moreover, the concurrence seemingly, but not explicitly,
abandoned the pervasively sectarian standard, as the schools at
issue were clearly "pervasively sectarian" under the Court's prior
rulings. By contrast, the dissenting Justices, who included Souter,
Stevens, and Ginsburg, contended that any form of government aid
that could potentially be diverted towards religious activities violates the Establishment Clause. 341
It seems that none of the Justices is ready to uphold direct
cash grants to houses of worship if the funds are used for religious
purposes, at least in the absence of private choice. The charitable
choice legislation intends to avoid this result by requiring that religious organizations not use federal funds for proselytizing or worship. In other words, charitable choice aims to fund only secular
activities carried out by religious groups. At the same time, however, charitable choice aims to preserve the spiritual character of
religious groups, which is, after all, the supposed source of their
effectiveness in the social service field. However, it is hard to see

337. Id. at 857. The concurrence concluded that any divertability that had occurred in the
case before it was de minimis. Id. at 864.
338. Id. at 837-39.
339. Id. at 843. "[T]he most important reason for according special treatment to direct money
grants is that this form of aid falls precariously close to the original object of the Establishment
Clause's prohibition." Id. at 856.
340. Id. at 842-44. The Court has frequently upheld aid programs to parochial schools where
there was an intervening element of private choice. That is, where "[a]ny aid ... tbat ultimately
flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of tbe genuinely independent and private
choices of aid recipients." Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986)
(upholding state grant to disabled student choosing to use his grant for training as a pastor); see
also, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (upholding special education services to student attending parochial high school); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390-91
(1983) (upholding state income tax deduction for tuition for parents enrolling their children in K12 schools, including parochial schools). However, it is not clear that private intervening choice
truly severs the link between the state aid and the sectarian recipient. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 191 (2000) ("The theory of the individual as causative agent does not
break the connection between a state funding program and its beneficiaries when the individual's private choice simply operates, in an anticipated and authorized way, as a part of the state
funding scheme.").
341. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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how both objectives can be served simultaneously. As one commentator has explained this tension:
Churches and other houses of worship cannot separate the act of charity from the
reason they feel compelled to offer the act. If houses of worship are asked to per·
form acts of charity without communicating the underlying message of faith that
inspires them, the act loses much of its life·changing impact. But if the religious
message accompanies the acts-acts funded by the government's money and de·
termined by the state's rules of eligibility-then the most basic aspects of the Es·
tablishment Clause are impIicated. 342

Under charitable choice, which struggles to reconcile neutrality and religiosity, a beneficiary may well end up receiving services from an organization with religious symbols on the walls, a
discriminatory hiring policy, and required prayer led by an employee whose position is funded by private dollars. This likely scenario links government funding to coercive and indoctrinating practices-a combination that the Court has held to violate the Establishment Clause as an advancement of religion. Simply put, while
most would agree that worship and proselytizing are religious practices, it is not clear why permitted practices under charitable
choice-religious symbolism, expressions of religious belief, and hiring discrimination against nonbelievers-are not. These permitted
activities pose the same risks of coercion and indoctrination as traditional religious activities such as worship and proselytizing. 343

342. Derek Davis, Right Motive, Wrong Method: Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Chari·
table Choice, in WELFARE REFORM & FAITH· BASED ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 5, at 267, 291.
The difficulty between separating secular goals from sectarian programs is highlighted in are·
cent district court case, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950,
950 (W.D. Wis. 2002), which struck down state funding of a faith·based, long·term residential
alcohol and drug rehabilitation program. Id. The program at issue, called Faith Works, used a
Christian·enhanced model of the Alcoholics Anonymous twelve·step program. Id. at 951. Partici·
pants were told during intake that the program was faith·based; spiritual matters were dis·
cussed at mandatory meetings; counselors were available to advise participants on spiritual
matters; and the program sponsored Bible study, chapel services, and daily prayer time. Id. at
966. The staff encouraged participants to "integrate spirituality into their recovery program." Id.
The court concluded that the spiritual and sectarian aspects of the program could not be sepa·
rated. Id. Indeed, the reason that the state had chosen Faith Works as a contracting partner was
because of its religious orientation and holistic approach. Id. at 967, 970. Thus, there was "direct
state funding of persons who actively inculcate religious beliefs" in violation of the Establish·
ment Clause. Id. at 965, 976. The court expressly refused to rule upon the constitutionality of the
charitable choice legislation. Id. at 979.
343. For this reason, it is unlikely that setting up affiliated, tax·exempt charities resolves the
First Amendment problem. As Stephen Monsma found in his study of religiously affiliated non·
profits, most of them freely admitted that they engaged in a range of religious activities that
arguably offend the First Amendment, such as informally referring to religious ideas, holding
voluntary religious activities, giving hiring preferences to coreligionists, and encouraging reli·
gious commitments by beneficiaries. MONSMA, supra note 46, at 63·108. He concludes that "legal
doctrines set down by the Supreme Court are simply ignored when policy elites and nonprofits
find it convenient to do so." Id. at 109.

870

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VoL 54:799

Although the Justices still appear wary of government funds going
directly to religious purposes, they have never fully defined what
religious purposes mean. Accordingly, charitable choice may force
the Court to articulate more clearly what constitutes "religion."
An even harder question is whether the Court would permit
direct cash grants to houses of worship even if the secular and sectarian components of the programs could be separated. For the
three Mitchell dissenters, even the potential for divertibility of government funds is fatal,344 For the remaining six Justices, a voucher
program may be more constitutionally palatable given the appearance of intervening private choice that underlies such programs. 345
Private choice supposedly removes the specter of government endorsement and indoctrination of religion. Yet, ironically, a charitable choice voucher program could result in a greater degree of religious coercion and indoctrination of social service beneficiaries. As
noted earlier, the conception of "choice" in the area of social services
may be an illusion, given the vulnerable state of many beneficiaries. Recall that the statute does not require religious organizations
to notify beneficiaries of alternative sources for receiving benefits.346 In addition, while the charitable choice provision in the PRA
requires that there be no worship or proselytizing with government
funds under contracting schemes, there are no such limitations in
voucher programs. Thus, under the voucher scenario, beneficiaries
may be directed towards religious providers, uninformed about
available alternatives, and required to pray to receive benefits. This
scenario raises concerns about government coercion and indoctrination not present in Mitchell; thus, charitable choice in any of its
forms may not fit within the paradigms established in the Mitchell
case.
The battle lines drawn by the Justices in Mitchell will be further tested when the Court considers the controversial issue of
school vouchers. The Supreme Court recently agreed to review a
school voucher case arising out of the Sixth Circuit, in which the
court struck down a voucher program in Cleveland, Ohio as violating the Establishment Clause because the program "involves the
grant of state aid directly and predominantly to the coffers of ...

344. 530 U.S. at 890 (Souter, J., dissenting).
345. Id. at 816.
346. See supra note 29. Proposed legislation, however, does contain a notice requirement.
H.R. 7, 107th Congo § 1991 (2001).
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private, religious schools."347 If the Court. approves of school vouchers, it will likely uphold any charitable choice program. The Court
has indicated that government funding of religious schools raises
greater Establishment Clause concerns than similar funding of social service programs because of the vulnerability of children and
the unique role scho'ols play in forming moral character.348 In this
regard, recall that the Supreme Court has upheld both of the statefunded, religiously affiliated social service programs that have come
before it. 349 Even if the Court strikes down the Cleveland school
voucher program, charitable choice will likely be analyzed under a
different rubric and could well survive, particularly because the
charitable choice legislation was specifically drafted to meet the
Court's specific concerns about coercion and indoctrination. Moreover, given the Court's preference for a fact-based, program-specific
inquiry in evaluating state aid programs,350 it is unlikely that the
Court will strike down any charitable choice legislation. Rather, we
can most likely expect that federal and state courts will spend considerable time and effort in the future evaluating a wide array of
state-funded, religiously affiliated social service programs and determining the constitutionality of specific programs.
B. Can the Government Regulate Religious Organizations?
Assuming that some form of charitable choice survives constitutional scrutiny, as is likely, the next question is whether and to
what extent government can regulate its religious grantees. The
term "regulate" is not used here to mean only formal regulations
347. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 960 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 533 U.S.
976 (2001) (mem.). Under the Cleveland program, scholarships were targeted to low-income
elementary school children who attended private schools that enrolled in the program. [d. at 948.
Eighty-two percent of the schools registered to participate in the program in the 1999-2000
school year were sectarian, and ninety-six percent of the students enrolled in the program attended sectarian schools. [d. at 949. As to other leading school voucher cases, the courts have
split. For instance, a school voucher program in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was upheld by that
state's highest court, Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Wis.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998), while the Vermont Supreme Court held that a school voucher program violated state
constitutional law, Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 542 (Vt. 1999).
348. Also, as a result of the history of religious school funding in this country, the Court has
always treated funding cases involving primary and secondary education as a separate class. See
Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 50-53
(1997); supra text accompanying notes 38-52. The Court may also treat school funding cases
differently because of "the place of civic and cultural meaning that schooling" occupies. Minow,
supra note 266, at 556.
349. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593 (1988); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 300
(1899).
350. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620-22.
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issued through notice and comment procedures, but more broadly to
include all forms of government oversight and monitoring that
should accompany the transfer of government funds to private bodies. Traditionally, religious individuals and groups have sought exemptions from government regulation through the Free Exercise
Clause, asserting that governmental involvement in their affairs
infringes upon freedom of their religious practices. Several prominent scholars currently interpret the Religion Clauses as requiring
"positive neutrality." Under this view, government must treat secular and sectarian groups alike in distributing grants (an Establishment Clause argument), but restrain from regulating sectarian
groups once funds are distributed (a Free Exercise Clause argument).351 As to the latter point, these scholars argue that the government interferes the least with religion when it leaves religion
alone, thereby securing free exercise values. However, since 1990,
when the Court in Employment Division v. Smith held that religious groups are subject to neutral laws of general applicability,
claims such as these for mandatory exemptions from regulation are
unlikely to prevail. 352 A bit of background is helpful.
Prior to Smith, the Court used a compelling interest test to
police the boundary between permissible and unduly burdensome
regulation. 353 This test was set forth in Sherbert v. Verner. 354 The
Court first asked whether the government had imposed any burden
on the free exercise of religion; the Court then examined whether
the government had a compelling state interest justifying the free
exercise infringement and whether the regulation was narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest with the least possible intrusion on
free exercise rights. 355 Sherbert involved a Seventh-day Adventist
who was denied state unemployment compensation after she re351. See, e.g., MONSMA, supra note 46, at 173-97; Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for
Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. I, 21
(1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. I, 42
(2000). Their nondiscrimination principle is built largely on Court holdings in free speech cases,
where the Court has ruled that government may not deny religious groups access to religious
forums. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995)
(disallowing university's refusal to fund student-run Christian newspaper); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (holding that the government may not
forbid the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a Latin Cross in a public square). It is not clear that a
majority of the Court is willing to go as far in endorsing government funding of the nonexpressive aspects of religious groups.
352. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
353. It has long been acknowledged that government can regulate to prevent "immediate
threat to public safety, peace, or order." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S 296, 308 (1940).
354. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
355. Id. at 406.
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fused to work on Saturday because of her religious beliefs. 356 The
Court held that the denial of benefits burdened her free exercise
rights by forcing her to make an untenable choice between her religious beliefs and work. 357 Moreover, the state could not point to any
compelling interest for denying her benefits, as no evidence indicated that the state unemployment compensation system was or
would be burdened by false claims. 358
Despite the compelling interest test, after Sherbert, the
Court upheld most challenged government regulations before it,
ruling that the neutral application of administrative systems constituted a compelling state interest. 359 Thus, for instance, in United
States v. Lee 360 the Court concluded that an Amish employer had to
pay Social Security taxes despite the employer's claim that the
Amish believe there is a religious obligation to provide for their fellow members and that they therefore do not believe in the national
Social Security system. 361 The Court explained that allowing individual exemptions from the Social Security system would result in
an administrative quagmire, stating that "[i]t would be difficult to
accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad
exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs."362 More-

356. Id. at 399·401.
357. Id. at 404.
358. Id. at 407. The high·water mark for the Sherbert test was Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 207 (1972), in which the Court held that a state could not compel Amish parents to send
their children to high school through age sixteen. Id. Again, the Court focused on the untenable
choice posed to the Amish parents, commenting that state law "compels them, under threat of
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious
beliefs." Id. at 218.
359. Unemployment cases, however, remained as a class of cases in which the court regularly
granted exemptions from state law. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S.
136, 146 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720
(1981).
360. 455 U.S. 252, 254 (1982).
361. Id. at 257.
362. Id. at 259·60. This neutrality rationale was also the touchstone in Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 441·42, 451 (1988), in which the Court held that
the Forest Service could construct a road through a sacred Native American site despite the
acknowledged "devastating effects" this would have on the practice of the plaintiff tribe's relig.
ion. Id. at 441·42, 451. Justice O'Connor stated that "government simply could not operate if it
were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires .... The First Amendment
must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that
do not prohibit the free exercise of religion." Id. at 452; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v.
Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389, 391·92 (1990) (holding that the state could retroactively
impose sales and use taxes on the sale of religious articles by a religious ministry because the
law applied "neutrally to all retail sales," and there was no evidence that collection of the taxes
burdened the ministries' sincere religious beliefs); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696, 712 (1986)
(holding that the government could require a Native American parent to accede to the use of a
Social Security number for his two·year·old daughter despite claims that the use of a numerical
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over, the Court reasoned that if one "enter[s] into commercial activity as a matter of choice," one's religious beliefs "are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which are binding on 'others
in th[e] activity."363
These cases foreshadowed the Court's decision in Smith, a 54 ruling in which the Court formally abandoned the compelling
state interest requirement altogether. 364 There, the Court stated
that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."365 Smith involved
two Native Americans who were fired by a private drug rehabilitation organization after they used peyote at a Native American
church ceremony.366 The state denied their unemployment compensation applications pursuant to a state law that disqualified employees discharged for work-related misconduct. 367 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, reasoned that if a state could criminalize
conduct, it could also penalize the conduct in its unemployment
scheme. 36B He stated, "We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."369
The Smith Court, however, recognized at least two exceptions to its holding. First, where the free exercise claim is joined
with another constitutional protection, that hybrid claim might be
entitled to an exemption. 370 For instance, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the
successful claim of Amish parents for an exemption from a school
attendance requirement involved not only the Free Exercise Clause
but also the parents' constitutional right to direct the education of
their children. 371 Unfortunately, the Smith Court did not address
the level of scrutiny that applies to a hybrid claim or how strong
each or both of the claims need to be to succeed. Second, where the
law at issue provides for individualized determinations of exemp-

identifier would rob her spirit); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding that the IRS could deny tax-exempt status to a religious college that engaged in racial discrimination).
363. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261.
364. 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
365. Id. at 879 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
366. Id. at 874.
367.Id.
368. Id. at 872.
369. Id. at 878-79.
370. Id. at 881-83.
371. 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972).
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tion, "[the government] may not refuse to extend that system to
cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."372 The best
example here is Sherbert, in which the state had the discretion to
make individualized determinations for statutory exemptions. 373
The Smith decision was intensely controversial, and was attacked as the downfall of religious liberty.374 In 1993, Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the stated
purpose of which was to "restore the compelling state interest test"
of Sherbert. 375 RFRA was short-lived, however. In City of Boerne v.
Flores, the Court declared RFRA unconstitutional as it applied to
the states. 376 Motivated by separation of powers and federalism concerns, the Court reasoned that Congress exceeded its power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in passing RFRA, because
"[l]egislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be said to be enforcing the clause."377 However, RFRA may
remain the standard as applied to free exercise challenges to federallaws. 378
Accordingly, at this time, neutral, generally applicable government regulations-even those that arguably burden religious
groups-are presumptively constitutional. However, there are at
least four instances in which religious groups can challenge state .
and local government regulation: (1) when the free exercise violation is linked with another constitutional violation (a hybrid claim);
(2) when the regulation at issue requires some form of individualized determination; (3) when the law at issue is not neutral; and (4)

372. 494 u.s. at 884.
373. In addition, the compelling state interest test remains the test for cases involving laws
that target religion, i.e., laws which are non· neutral. Thus, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993), the Court struck down a series of local ordinances, which although facially neutral, were targeted against a religious group's use of animal
sacrifice. The Court held that the ordinances were not "neutral and of general applicability," but
instead were enacted with the object of "the suppression of religion." Id. at 531, 542. None of the
charitable choice provisions or proposed accountability mechanisms in this Article implicates the
concerns underlying Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye.
374. See Jonathan C. Lipson, On Balance: Religious Liberty and Third-Party Harms, 84
MINN. L. REV. 589, 643 n.279 (2000) (citing sources); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the
Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045,
1055 n.42 (2000) (same).
375. Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.s.C. § 2000bb
(1994».
376. 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
377. Id. at 519.
378. See Gregory P. Magarian, How to Apply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitution, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1915-17 (2001) (setting forth
split in courts as to whether the RFRA applies to federal legislation and arguing in favor of such
application).
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when the regulation violates Establishment Clause rights by excessively entangling church and state. 379 The proposed accountability
mechanisms in this Article are unlikely to fall within any of these
Smith exceptions. 38o
First, the proposed quality assurance regulations do not implicate the hybrid exception to Smith because they do not violate
other constitutional guarantees. Although it is certainly easy for
plaintiffs to allege a violation of another constitutional right such
as the rights of association or speech, mere allegations are not sufficient to garner an exemption. Rather, in cases interpreting the
hybrid exception that have ruled in favor of the religious plaintiffs,
the decisions generally could stand on the independent constitutional right alone. 381 Such independent rights are not present in
this context. For instance, grantees might argue that accountability
measures force them to adapt their messages in order to achieve
social service objectives. However, there is no free speech violation
when the government restricts the messages it wants to accompany
government-funded programs delivered by private entities. 382

379. State constitutional law is not a useful source for challenging regulation of charitable
choice spending because the federal charitable choice legislation preempts state law. Although
the statute provides: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt any provision of a
State constitution or State statute that prohibits or restricts the expenditure of state funds in or
by religious organizations," 42 u.s.c. § 604a(k) (1994), this language references only state funds.
Thus, it means that expenditure of federal welfare funds remains subject to federal law. Of
course, a state-funded charitable choice program could be challenged on state constitutional
grounds. Several states have enacted their own statutes to encourage contracts with faith-based
organizations.
,
Also, while RFRA challenges could possibly be brought to federal accountability regulations
should they be enacted, see supra note 378, the proposals in this Article would likely be implemented on a state or local basis in keeping with the PRA's emphasis on devolving authority
downward.
Religious organizations might challenge the financial auditing requirements as a burden on
free exercise. However, even under the compelling state interest test, the provision would likely
be upheld. The state has a compelling interest in ensuring that its funds are properly spent on
the defined statutory purposes, and the religious organizations are not excessively burdened by
such reporting requirements-especially since the charitable choice legislation gives them a
special accommodation that allows them to segregate charitable choice funds for accounting
purposes.
380. The excessive entanglement argument is addressed in detail infra Part IV.C.
381. Kaplan, supra note 374, at 1068-69. But see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 709, 711 (9th Cir.) (concerning landlords who asserted "colorable claim"
that antidiscrimination law violated their religious, free speech, and property rights), vacated,
192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999).
382. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991). Rust involved a federal statute that provided
federal funding for family planning services. The statute provided that none of the funds "shall
be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." [d. at 178. The implementing regulations stated that grantees could not: refer women to abortion providers; engage in
abortion rights lobbying or advocacy; and be physically or financially connected to abortion ac-
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Second, as long as quality assurance regulations do not contain "hardship," "good cause," or other similar exceptions, they will
not raise the concern that government officials could discriminate
against or in favor of religion. Little incentive exists for governments to incorporate individualized exceptions into quality assurance regulations, as such determinations are costly and inefficient.
To the degree that a given provider would claim a hardship from
complying with auditing requirements or the like, the provider is
likely not a qualified candidate for service delivery and the sophistication such programs require in the first place.
Third, the proposed quality assurance regulations would be,
and should be, neutrally applied to all providers, whether they are
government agencies, nonprofit secular groups, or sectarian organizations. The purpose of such regulations is to ensure that the government obtains results for its expenditures, and accordingly, the
regulations target no particular type of group for examination.
Thus, where states or localities seek, either by regulation or by contract, to apply accountability mechanisms to religious groups accepting charitable choice funds, these methods are likely to survive
free exercise scrutiny. Along these lines, it should be noted that social service ministries are regulated in other regards as well, and
that challenges to such neutral regulations on the basis of religion
generally fai1. 383 Federal laws that affect social service ministries
include labor law and employee benefits, as well as tax and antidiscrimination laws. 384 At the state and local level, religious organizations are subject to laws relating to licensing, workers' compensation, labor relations, safety, incorporation, taxes, human rights and
antidiscrimination, charitable solicitation, lobbying and political
activity, zoning, health, sanitation, food handling, environmental

tivities. Id. at 179-80. The Court held that the regulations were not an unconstitutional restriction on speech, but rather that "public funds [can] be spent for the purposes for which they were
authorized." Id. at 196.
383. As one commentator'explained:
The amenahility of churches to some governmental regulation is not seriously
disputed. For example, few would protest the application to churches of laws
prohibiting fraud in the sale of securities, requiring donated funds to be expended for the purposes represented, protecting copyright owners against infringement, or prohibiting activities that cause physical harm, property damage, or material disturbance to others. Similarly, churches routinely comply
with municipal building codes and zoning regulations in the construction and
location of worship facilities.
Hammar, supra note 205, § 9-0l.
384. See Esbeck, supra note 316, at 360-66; see also Rogers, supra note 5, at 64-66. Rogers believes that "most churches are not equipped to jump through the regulatory hoops necessary to
prove compliance with such laws .... [and that] proving compliance is likely to take a large toll
on religious autonomy." Rogers, supra note 5, at 65.
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regulation, and building and fire codes. 385 In return for their compliance with this web of neutral regulations, religious organizations
receive the benefits available to secular organizations and individuals, such as police and fire protection and access to roads, water, and power. To be sure, quality assurance regulations probe into
the programmatic aspects of a social service organization, but they
do not mandate a specific course of action, and they apply equally to
all grantees. Moreover, unlike the various federal and state statutes listed above, which apply across the board, charitable choice
regulations apply only to an entity that has chosen to participate in
social service delivery. Thus, there is no arguable element of coercion or of "untenable choice," factors which concerned the Court in
Sherbert.

C. How Extensively Can the Government Regulate Religious
Organizations?
Although government can regulate religious organizations
through generally applicable, neutral laws, this authority is not
boundless. At some point, government regulation of religious groups
can become so onerous that the regulations end up violating the
Establishment Clause's prohibition on excessive entanglement between government and religion. Identifying the boundary between
permissible and impermissible entanglement, however, is no easy
task.
The notion of excessive entanglement was first articulated in
Walz v. Tax Commission, in which the Court held that a state could
exempt religious organizations along with other nonprofit, charitable organizations from state property taxes. 386 The Court reasoned
in part that the exemption was less entangling than the alternative
of imposing the tax, which would "tend to expand the involvement
of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property,
tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes."387 Conversely, the Court has upheld laws that imposed taxes on or denied
deductions for religious organizations, ruling that such neutral

385. See Esbeck, supra note 316, at 381-86; Rogers, supra note 5, at 66-67.
386. 397 U.s. 664, 674 (1970).
387. Id. The Court ignored the fact that granting exemptions also requires the government to
evaluate the legitimacy of the claims for exemption-a task arguably more likely to result in
government assessments about religion. See Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment
• Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 1010 (1999).
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laws are not excessively entangling. For instance, in Hernandez u.
Commissioner, the Court held that disallowing deductions for contributions to the Church of Scientology for auditing sessions was
not excessively entangling. 388 The Court stated that "routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine,
no delegation of state power to a religious body, ... and no 'detailed
monitoring and close administrative contact' between secular and
religious bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement
command."389 The Court has also upheld regulations requiring religious organizations to maintain various sorts of records related to
secular objectives. 39o Taken together, these cases indicate that the
Court tends to defer to Congress when it enacts regulations that are
unrelated to policing the boundary between sectarian and secular.
Mter Walz, the excessive entanglement inquiry became part
of the Lemon test,391 under which the Court evaluates alleged Establishment Clause violations by looking to the statute's purpose,
effect, and entanglement between church and state. Notably, this
formulation permits some entanglement; it bars only those entanglements that are deemed excessive. 392 In Lemon itself, the Court
struck down a state policy that reimbursed parochial schools for
part of the costs of teaching secular students. 393 Excessive entanglement arose in that case because "[a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to
ensure that [the restrictions on aid] are obeyed and the First
Amendment otherwise respected."394 Thus, the Court has been most
troubled by regulations, such as those in Lemon, which attempt to
monitor the use of government aid to ensure that it is not spent for

388. 490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989).
389. Id. at 696·97 (citations omitted); see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equaliza·
tion, 493 U.S. 378, 394 (1990) (rmding that the imposition of generally applicable sales and use
tax on religious organization did not result in excessive entanglement between government and
religion).
390. See, e.g., Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305·06 (1985)
("The Establishment Clause does not exempt religious organizations from such secular govern·
mental activity as flre inspections and building and zoning regulations ... and the recordkeeping
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, while perhaps more burdensome in terms of pa·
perwork, are not signillcantly more intrusive into religious affairs."); cf. NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 503·07 (1979) (holding that the NLRB does not have jurisdiction over a
Catholic school's teachers in the absence of clear congressional intent because of potential for
entanglement).
391. See supra note 322.
392. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997) ("Not all entanglements, of course, have the
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Interaction between church and state is inevitable, ...
and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two.").
393. 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
394. Id. at 619.
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religious purposes. 395 But even in these sorts of cases, the Court has
recently become more accepting of a variety of monitoring measures.
In the 1997 case of Agostini, the Court tweaked the Lemon
test, but Justice O'Connor confirmed that entanglement was still a
relevant inquiry.396
[T]he factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is "excessive" are similar
to the factors we use to examine "effect." That is, to assess entanglement, we have
looked to "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between
the government and religious authority."397

Thus, entanglement remains a basis for striking down government
regulation, which is, of course, why it has become a popular argument for foes of regulation in the face of Smith's almost blanket approval of government regulation as consistent with the Free Exercise Clause. 39B Agostini upheld a federally funded program in New
York City that sent public school teachers into religious schools to
provide remedial education for disadvantaged students. 399 Although
the program called for unannounced monthly visits of public supervisors to ensure that funds were not spent to inculcate religion, the
Court decided that this level of monitoring did not amount to excessive entanglement. 4oo In fact, citing to Bowen, the Court noted that
it had upheld far greater entanglements in the past. 401
As noted earlier, the AFLA, which was the statute involved
in Bowen, contained various ongoing oversight mechanisms to ensure that funds were spent in line with congressional intent and in
accord with the Establishment Clause. 402 These mechanisms included government evaluations of the services provided, required
reports from grantees, and grantee disclosures on application forms
as to the nature of the services that would be provided. 403 In addition, the Court recognized that the Department of Health and Hu-

395. See id.
396. See supra note 321.
397. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (citation omitted).
398. See Gerstenblith, supra note 186, at 472-73.
399. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234-35. In Agostini, the Court overruled its decision twelve years
prior in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
400. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234.
401. [d. The Agostini Court rejected its prior statements that a program that might increase
the dangers of "political divisiveness" or that requires "administrative cooperation" between
government and parochial schools is excessively entangling. [d. at 233.
402. 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988).
403. [d.

2002]

"CHARITABLE CHOICE"

881

man Services would review AFLA-funded programs, including educational materials, and might visit program offices. 404
The Court commented on the Catch-22 nature of its emphasis on excessive entanglement; in some circumstances, "the very
supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion
renders the statute invalid."405 However, in the case of AFLA, because the religious organizations at issue were not pervasively sectarian, there was no reason "to fear that ... the Government [will]
intrude unduly in the day-to-day operation of the religiously affiliated AFLA grantees,"406 in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
The Court thus appeared to assume that a "less" religious organization would require less policing than a "more" religious one because
the former is less likely to be inculcating religion. 407 Now that the
Court is leaning towards abandoning the pervasively sectarian
standard, the Court likely will see even less need for policing proper
First Amendment boundaries. Because the inechanisms proposed in
this Article deal with quality issues rather than First Amendment
issues, they should implicate constitutional concerns to an even
lesser degree.
The proposed accountability mechanisms are focused on
achieving secular objectives and ensuring that public funds are
spent on programs that deliver measurable results for beneficiaries.
They open up all organizations to scrutiny, but they do not proscribe or prescribe any particular method for delivering the services
at issue. Accordingly, while they involve some entanglement between government and religion, the entanglement is not more excessive than that envisioned in Bowen, and it does not infringe on
the religious character of the organizations. To the degree providers
claim that the religious nature of their programs is compromised by
such regulation, they are essentially admitting that they are commingling government funds for religious purposes-an admission
that is fatal under charitable choice.

404. [d. at 616·17.
405. [d. at 615.
406. [d. at 616; see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 763-64 (1976) (finding no
excessive entanglement where state conducts annual audits to ensure that categorical state
grants to religious colleges are not used to teach religion). As noted previously, it appears that
the "pervasively sectarian" limitation on government aid is no longer controlling law. See supra
notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
407. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 616.
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D. Can the Legislature Exempt Religious Organizations from
Regulation?
Although Smith holds that religious organizations do not
have a constitutional right to mandatory exemptions from neutral
government regulations, the decision expressly leaves open the possibility of legislative, or permissive, accommodations to religion. 408
Indeed, in Smith, Justice Scalia noted that a state or federal legislature could exempt sacramental drugs from its drug laws, and
Oregon did exactly that after the Smith ruling.409
At some point, however, an accommodation can tip over into
favoritism towards religion in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 41o Yet the Court has not defined where this tipping point
lies. 411 This issue is significant in the charitable choice context for
two reasons. First, the charitable choice legislation makes some
clear accommodations to religious groups, including a tailored auditing provision, an exemption from nondiscrimination in employment laws, and a mandate that governments not interfere with the
religious character of grantees. Nonsectarian groups do not have
these "benefits." Secular groups may therefore challenge the existing accommodations. Second, a heightened accountability scheme
such as that proposed in this Article could be subject to demands
from religious groups for various exemptions. Indeed, many proponents of charitable choice legislation, including President Bush,
408. 494 u.s. 872, 890 (1990).
409. Id.; see WITIE, supra note 311, at 145. Likewise, in response to a circuit court decision,
Congress passed the Equal Access Act requiring that secondary schools with limited open forums
permit religious groups to conduct meetings on school property, id., and Congress amended the
military code to allow the wearing of yarmulkes after the Supreme Court held that there was no
constitutional right to such an exemption, id.
410. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706 (1994) (striking down separate
school district created for religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim and noting that "accommodation
is not a principle without limits").
411. Scholars have hotly debated what the scope of permissive accommodation should be.
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARy L. REV.
1007, 1014 (2001) (arguing that permissive accommodations should take into account principles
of equal treatment, that is, they should be permitted as long as accommodations are extended to
similarly situated nonreligious claimants); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The
Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1248 (1994) (arguing that permissive accommodations should be permitted
only where necessary to protect religious practices against discrimination); Ira C. Lupu, The
Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743, 768 (1992) (arguing that there should
be no permissive accommodations, in part because such accommodations tend to be religionspecific and prefer religion over nonreligion); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 689-93 (1992) (arguing that
accommodations should always be permitted as they achieve purposes of both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses).
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want to exclude religious groups from any sort of regulation whatsoever related to charitable choice. They argue that churches are
discouraged from applying for charitable choice funds because of a
fear of governmental intrusion.
The Court has held that certain accommodations for religious groups are appropriate to achieve a level of neutrality between religion and nonreligion and to relieve religious practices
from government-created burdens. Thus, in Walz, the Court approved a property tax exemption for religious and other nonprofit
groups because historically such exemptions reflected a "kind of
benevolent neutrality toward churches."412 Central to its holding
was the fact that secular organizations and nonprofits were also
entitled to the exemption, and there was thus no favoritism for religion. 413 This accomodationist approach reached its zenith in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, in which the Court upheld a 1972
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that exempted religious nonprofit organizations from the general prohibition against
religious discrimination in employment. 414 The Court reasoned that
the exemption "alleviat[ed] significant governmental interference
with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out
their religious missions."415 The result in Amos seems to reflect not
only the Court's desire to protect some free exercise values but also
its long-standing discomfort with interfering in the internal operations of churches. 416 Where an accommodation is not related to protecting the doctrinal aspects of a religious group's beliefs or operations, the Court is more likely to strike down the accommodation as
pure favoritism of religion. Thus, two years after Amos, in Texas
Monthly v. Bullock, the Court put firm limits on permissive accommodations, striking down a sales tax exemption for religious periodicals because the benefits of the exemption flowed only to reli-

412. 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
413. In a prior case, Zorach v. Clauson, the Court approved a release time program to allow
religious students in public schools to attend off-site religious classes, calling the program a
"suitable accommodation ... to spiritual needs." 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). The result in Zorach is
questionable given its favoritism of religious beliefs over nonreligion. See Lupu, supra note 310,
at 791 (explaining the result in Zorach as a result of the Cold War era in which it was decided:
"Zorach arguably involved government resources for religion alone, symbolic government support
for religion, and proreligious government coercion-a combination that one today would expect to
be fatal to any government policy challenged on Establishment Clause grounds.").
414. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
415. ld. at 335.
416. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
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gious groups.417 In Texas Monthly, the Court identified three limits
on permissive accommodations. 418 Not only must they be designed
to alleviate a government-created burden on religion, but they cannot favor particular sects, favor religious groups over nonreligious
groups, or burden nonbeneficiaries. 419
The existing charitable choice accommodations, all of which
are designed to preserve the unique character of religious organizations, run the risk of unduly favoring religion. This is another way
of saying that the accommodations, drafted with free exercise principles in mind, might ultimately be invalidated under the Establishment Clause. For instance, under charitable choice, governments cannot interfere with the messages of religious groups, but
they can restrict the messages of secular groups.420 Moreover, while
government funds cannot be used for proselytizing or worship, private funds may be so used as part of the same program. Courts may
deem the special treatment for religious speech in this context a
"statutory preference for the dissemination of religious ideas" that
"offends our most basic understanding of what the Establishment
Clause is all about."421
The accommodation limiting the scope of audits for religious
organizations might also be deemed unlawful favoritism. Religious
groups will be able to hide how their nongovernmental funds are
spent, and, given that private funds can be used for proselytizing
and worship, this will make it nearly impossible to get a complete
picture of how social services are delivered at a particular site. 422
Finally, the exemption granted to charitable choice providers from
the federal civil rights law prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of religion could be attacked as an unlawful accommodation given
the overlay of government funding. In Amos, the Court viewed this
Title VII exemption as a way to keep government from interfering

417. 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
418. [d. at 10-13.
419. [d. The Court has also struck down legislative attempts to provide employees with an
absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703, 710-11 (1985), and a state attempt to carve out a special school district for a particular religious sect, Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994). In the former case,
the Court was concerned about the burden tbe accommodation would put on employers, and in
the latter case, the Court was concerned about favoritism towards a particular religion. Caldor,
472 U.S. at 706-09.
420. See Brownstein, supra note 308, at 242; Green, supra note 310, at 714-15.
421. Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
422. The remedy here would be to expand the scope of audits, not to eliminate them for all
contractors.
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with religion in its purely private sphere. 423 However, under charitable choice, discrimination is no longer carried on solely in the private sphere; rather, it is government funded. Given that charitable
choice funds are only supposed to be used for secular purposes, government-funded discrimination does not serve free exercise values.
These types of accommodations should not be extended when
it comes to quality control. That is, legislators and administrators
should approach with caution requests for exemptions from accountability mechanisms, as such exemptions may tilt over into the
realm of government sponsorship of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Most importantly, becoming a charitable choice
grantee is entirely voluntary. Thus, religious groups cannot claim
that they are subjected to a government-created burden on their
free exercise from which they need relief. This point was made in
United States v. Lee, where the Court ruled that the Amish must
pay Social Security taxes, stating that "[w]hen followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice,"424
they must abide by statutory schemes binding on others in the
same activity. In a sense, this notion of voluntariness is a corollary
to the current Court's determination that "private choice" absolves
a program of Establishment Clause concerns. Just as private choice
is seen to break the link between the government and the ultimate
aid recipient, voluntariness eases any concerns of coercion that accompany regulatory schemes. 425
In addition, quality assurance regulations are neutral as between religious and secular providers, and there are no questions of
favoritism of particular sects. Indeed, favoritism for religion would
arise by exempting religious groups from regulation while leaving
secular groups, which hold similarly strong but nonreligious convictions, more strictly accountable. Such favoritism is particularly
troubling, and unnecessary, where there is no interference with the
internal issues of church doctrine. The mechanisms proposed in this
Article do not specify how a program is to achieve its goals, they

423. 483 u.s. 327, 336 (1987).
424. 455 u.s. 252, 261 (1982).
425. The Court is less deferential to claims for religious exemption when the exemption could
result in a harm to third parties, although this is not an expressly stated factor in evaluating
claims for exemptions. See generally Lipson, supra note 374, at 615-22 ("[T]he continuum of
deference suggests that deference declines, and judicial scrutiny increases, in proportion to the
likelihood of third-party harm."). To exempt religious social service providers from an accountahility regime would likely result in harm to beneficiaries by exposing them to potentially ineffective services.
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seek only to ensure that community-based goals are achieved in a
fair and effective manner.
Finally, granting an exemption from such regulations for religious grantees could unduly burden secular grantees and the government. Demanding quality from secular groups while allowing
religious groups freedom to do as they please could result in radically different levels of services at different sites. To the degree that
a specific religious group does not provide effective services, the
burden falls on other providers to pick up the slack, and the harms
fall upon beneficiaries. Thus, under the Texas Monthly tests for
unlawful permissive exemptions, legislators and policymakers
should not award religious groups exemptions from any quality assurance regulations they implement. To the contrary, the neutral
distribution of government funds should be accompanied by the
neutral imposition of accountability mechanisms.
CONCLUSION

In the heady constitutional debates over charitable choice, it
is easy to forget that the real beneficiaries of charitable choice are
meant to be the poor. While there has been some acknowledgement
that charitable choice might force some beneficiaries to tolerate religious messages or even adopt religious practices in order to receive services, far less attention has been paid to the actual effectiveness of those services in meeting the beneficiaries' needs. Charitable choice promises that a spiritual approach is more effective
than a secular one in solving social problems. Yet at this time, no
reliable evidence exists to make the case either way. Thus, in undertaking this social experiment, we need to ensure that charitable
choice providers are accountable to those they are serving. Regardless of how one feels about charitable choice or even the premises
underlying welfare reform, it is obvious that to fulfill the legislative
mandate, the services provided must be effectively and fairly delivered. Nevertheless, existing and proposed charitable choice legislation does little to ensure accountability to beneficiaries.
If legislators are counting on the contracting process or a
voucher system to provide the needed accountability, they are
sorely misguided. Contract law grants scant rights to third-party
beneficiaries, and procurement processes ignore beneficiaries altogether. Likewise, vouchers cannot ensure accountability where consumers lack the necessary choices or information to "shop" effectively. In addition, a variety of immunities and limited fiduciary
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duties generally work to insulate churches and other religious organizations from public scrutiny.
Thus, it is time for the states and localities contracting for
social services to take affirmative steps to ensure that they are purchasing quality services. Importantly, in doing so, they need not
fear running afoul of First Amendment restrictions, an often-cited,
but misplaced concern when regulation of charitable choice programs is at issue. This fear of entanglement has kept state and local governments from intruding into religious affairs. While this
hands-off approach has a long and justified pedigree when churches
are operating in the private sphere, it has far less justification
when churches are spending public funds to carry out public purposes.
The First Amendment Religion Clauses prevent the government from advancing or inhibiting religion. The quality assurance
proposals set forth in this Article implicate neither of these prohibitions. These proposals do not prescribe or proscribe any particular
method for delivering services. Rather, by merging the principles of
performance contracting with citizen participation norms, the proposals ensure that all providers-secular and sectarian alike-are
selected and evaluated according to neutral standards set by the
community. Ensuring quality does not advance religion; it advances
successful programs whatever their orientation. At the same time,
government procurement agencies that set clear standards and focus on results do not inhibit religion because they do not tell
churches, or anyone else, how to achieve these goals. Churches that
do not want to support the underlying secular goals or to be held
accountable for how they spend government funds can always opt
out and, as they have traditionally done, provide services with their
own funds.
Accordingly, supporters of charitable choice should embrace
such regulation as a way to demonstrate the effectiveness of faithbased programs to the public. At the same time, quality assurance
regulations should provide some comfort to those uneasy with the
idea of charitable choice, because such regulations provide a
method for evaluating these programs and for protecting the rights
of beneficiaries.
This Article's proposed approach also fits within the Court's
recent moves towards neutrality in its Religion Clause jurisprudence. Recent cases have confirmed that the so-called wall of separation between church and state is no longer an accurate metaphor.
In Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court has moved away
from separationism towards a neutrality approach, under which
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secular and sectarian are entitled to the same benefits. Tbe Court
has also used neutrality as a touchstone in free exercise cases, allowing regulatory burdens to fall evenly upon both secular and sectarian groups. Thus, while Religion Clause jurisprudence is evershifting, the current Court would appear to support including sectarian providers in a social service delivery scheme while also holding them to the same regulatory and accountability standards as
other providers.
Spirituality alone is not enough to combat the complex root
causes of poverty and other social problems. While it may have
value for some individuals, we know far too little about when, how,
and for whom spiritually based programs work. We can and must
debate the constitutional implications of charitable choice, but we
should not forget the practical realities faced by our neediest citizens. For people who struggle daily to find and hold down jobs, to
secure decent and affordable housing, to feed and clothe themselves
and their children, these debates miss the mark. They need services
that work.

